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ABSTRACT 
Despite published warnings from the Department of Homeland Security, the 
current social, economic, and political environment is not likely to lead to a violent 
confrontation between right-wing extremist groups and government authorities.  This 
thesis applies the theory of collective behavior and examines—in the context of the 
current health care reform debate—existing conditions and dynamics and their influence 
on the domestic far right.  Although several determinants of collective behavior (i.e., 
structural conduciveness, structural strain, and ideology) produce a climate within which 
right-wing extremism can emerge and flourish, the lack of an influential far-right leader 
and the effective operation of existing social controls hinder the mobilization of the 
domestic far right.   
To counter right-wing extremism, the U.S. government should avoid dismissing 
outright the grievances of the far right.  Instead, the government should direct its efforts 
to reduce the social structures that create an environment in which right-wing extremism 
can emerge and flourish and to encourage and ensure the effective operation of social 
controls.  Endeavors along these lines are similar to international efforts countering 
radical Islamic extremism.  Further studies are needed to explore how counter-
radicalization approaches against Islamic extremists can be tailored to comply with 
domestic law and be applied to domestic right-wing extremists. 
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A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
As a consequence of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New 
York and against the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001, the United 
States has concentrated on combating Osama Bin Laden and other radical Islamic 
extremists.  Although the focused effort of the United States against these groups is 
understandable, the nation neglects to consider the intent and capacity of the domestic far 
right to conduct a violent terrorist campaign similar to those conducted in the early 1990s 
or a mass casualty terrorist attack on a scale similar to those Al Qaeda seeks to conduct.   
The domestic far right, whose ideologies and motivations are categorized under 
“right-wing extremism,” is reported to have been responsible for 75 terrorist incidents 
between the 1995 bombing of Oklahoma City and the summer of 2009.1  These plots 
include plans to bomb or burn government buildings, critical infrastructure, memorials, 
banks, clinics, and places of non-Christian worship; to assassinate law enforcement 
personnel, judges, politicians, and civil rights figures; to rob banks and armored cars; and 
to amass illegal machine guns, missiles, explosives, and biological and chemical 
weapons.2  In April 1997, three white supremacist adherents were arrested in a plot to 
blow up a natural gas refinery outside Fort Worth, Texas, as a diversion for a 
simultaneous armored car robbery.  Law enforcement officials estimated that the 
explosion would have killed as many as 30,000.3  In June 1999, two brothers—one a 
confirmed adherent of the anti-Semitic Christian Identity theology—carried out arson 
                                                 
1 Southern Poverty Law Center, The Second Wave: Return of the Militias (Montgomery, AL: Southern 
Poverty Law Center, 2009), 13, http://www.splcenter.org (accessed August 12, 2009). 
2 Andrew Blejwas, Anthony Griggs, and Mark Potok, “Terror From the Right: Almost 60 Terrorist 
Plots Uncovered  in the U.S.” Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report 118 (Summer 2005), 
http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=549 (accessed May 2, 2009); Larry Copeland, 
“Domestic Terrorism: New Trouble at Home,” USA Today, November 14, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/nation/2004–11-14-domestic-terrorism_x.htm (accessed April 12, 2009);  Rebecca Sinderbrand, “A 
Racist on the Rise: After a Post-9/11 Slump, Hate Groups See A Surge,” Newsweek, May 10, 2004, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/105098 (accessed May 1, 2009); Bennie G. Thompson, “10 Years After the 
Oklahoma City Bombing, the Department of Homeland Security Must Do More To Fight Right-Wing 
Domestic Terrorists,” April 19, 2005, 4–5, https://www.hsdl.org (accessed April 9, 2009). 
3 Southern Poverty Law Center, The Second Wave, 15. 
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attacks against three synagogues and an abortion clinic in Sacramento, California.  Two 
weeks later, they shot to death a gay couple at their home near Redding, California.  Both 
were convicted in September 2001.4  In May 2004, William Krar of Noonday, Texas was 
convicted for the possession of “enough sodium cyanide to kill everyone inside a 30,000-
square-foot building.”5   
Recently, the election of Barack Obama, an African-American, to the Presidency 
of the United States has triggered white supremacist activity.  In December 2008, parts of 
a dirty bomb were discovered in the home of a white supremacist adherent who was 
reportedly “very upset” when President Obama was elected into office.  In the summer of 
2009, an eighty-year-old, longtime neo-Nazi, James von Brunn, allegedly shot to death a 
security guard at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.  A note allegedly left my von 
Brunn reads: “Obama was created by Jews.  Obama does what his Jew owners tell him to 
do.”  Von Brunn has been charged with murder.6   
This thesis investigates significant social, economic, and political conditions and 
dynamics in the United States.  It particularly examines these conditions and dynamics in 
the context of the health care reform debate, which may have the potential to be a 
precipitating event around which violent right-wing extremists can rally.  In addition, it 
examines the motivations and goals of the various American domestic right-wing 
extremist groups, and tests the hypothesis advanced by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) that the current social, economic, and political environment is likely to 
lead to a violent confrontation between right-wing extremist groups and government 
authorities. 
B. WHAT IS RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM? 
DHS defined right-wing extremism in two of its recent documents.  In mid-April 
2009, it issued a report titled “Right-Wing Extremism: Current Economic and Political 
                                                 
4 PBS, “Citizens Respond to Hate: Sacramento, CA; Flames Ignite a Community,” 
http://www.pbs.org/niot/citizens_respond/sacramento.html (accessed September 2, 2009); Southern 
Poverty Law Center, The Second Wave, 17. 
5 Thompson, “10 Years After,” 7. 
6 Southern Poverty Law Center, The Second Wave, 23–24.  
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Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment” that characterized right-
wing extremism as primarily “based on hatred of particular religious, racial, or ethnic 
groups” that advocate the rejection of government authority.7  On May 5, 2009, DHS 
released its “Domestic Extremism Lexicon” that included single-issue groups—such as 
those that oppose abortion and immigration—in its definition of right-wing extremism.  
Although these two documents were designed to facilitate a greater understanding of the 
nature and scope of the threat posed by domestic, non-Islamic extremism,8 they became 
targets of public outrage.  DHS was charged with insinuating that several legal social 
groups were terrorist organizations and was accused of “equating conservative views to 
right-wing terrorism.”9  DHS immediately pulled its lexicon from circulation, stating it 
had been released without authorization.  DHS claims the definitions contained in its 
lexicon are not being used by law enforcement agencies.10  
The public outcry against the two DHS reports indicates a need to characterize 
correctly the phenomenon known as “domestic right-wing extremism.”  Without the 
appropriate frame, the government will remain unable to communicate to the public— 
without being accused of infringing upon American civil liberties—the threat posed by 
domestic right-wing extremist groups.  Accordingly, this thesis clarifies the use of the 
terms “far right” and “right-wing extremism,” carefully differentiating mainstream 
conservatives and their Constitutionally-protected activities from the terrorist actions of 
the far right.   
The term “extremism” implies that attitudes can be arranged on a continuum, with 
“normal and acceptable” views positioned in the center, and with the breadth of 
                                                 
7 Department of Homeland Security, Right-Wing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate 
Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment (Washington DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2009), 2. 
8 Audrey Hudson, “Homeland Agency Pulled Back Extremism Dictionary: Black Power, White 
Supremacists, Abortion Foes Make List,” Washington Times, May 5, 2009, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/05/homeland-pulled-back-extremism-dictionary/ 
(accessed May 5, 2009); Mike Levine, “Homeland Security Warns of Rise in Right-Wing Extremism,” 
FOX News, April 14, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/first100days/2009/04/14/homeland-security-
warns-rise-right-wing-extremism/ (accessed May 27, 2009). 
9 Mike Levine, “Homeland Security Warns.” 
10 Audrey Hudson, “Extremism Dictionary.” 
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acceptable views varying over time.11  In contrast, extremists advocate “fringe” 
positions12 and their non-mainstream views are often thought of as “ridiculous, 
dangerous, or both” and as typically containing some degree of intolerance and sense of 
superiority.13  In his 2003 article titled “The American Far Right and 9/11,” Martin 
Durham differentiated mainstream conservatism from its extremist cousin by their 
preference for political violence.  According to Durham, mainstream conservatives 
believe that “while liberalism represents a fundamental threat to the nation’s values, 
America has not yet lost either a free economy or a constitutional political system.”14  In 
contrast, he describes extremists as suspicious of free economy or of the political system, 
rejecting political compromise and believing “drastic action is needed.”15  Consistent 
with Durham’s differentiation, the term “extremism” is used in this thesis to distinguish 
between individuals and groups who conduct activities that can be characterized as 
political dissonance, which is protected under the U.S. Constitution and extremists who 
use violence for political and social gains.  Accordingly, groups and individuals 
participating in rallies and protests would not fall under the category of “extremist,” but 
activists who bomb public venues for political objectives would.   
The terms “right-wing” and “right,” are artifacts from the French National 
Assembly of 1789 wherein those who supported the status quo (i.e., the conservatives) 
sat on the right of the presiding officer, while those who called for change (i.e., the 
radicals) positioned themselves on the left.16  Thus, the Right originally defended the 
                                                 
11 Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda, Routledge 
Studies in Extremism and Democracy (London: Routledge, 2003), 19, 41; Peter H. Merkl, “Why Are They 
So Strong Now? Comparative Reflections on the Revival of the Radical Right in Europe,” in The Revival of 
Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties, Cass Series on Political Violence, ed. Peter H. Merkl and Leonard 
Weinberg (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 18; Lyman Tower Sargent, Extremism in America: A Reader (New 
York: New York University Press, 1995), 3. 
12 John George and Laird M. Wilcox, Nazis, Communists, Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe 
(Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1992), 55. 
13 Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism, 20–21. 
14 Martin Durham, “The American Far Right and 9/11,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 2 
(2003): 97, http://navynps.library.ingentaconnect.com.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed June 1, 2009). 
15 Durham, “The American Far Right,” 97. 
16 Michi Ebata, “Right-Wing Extremism: In Search of a Definition,” in The Extreme Right: Freedom 
and Security at Risk, ed. Aurel Braun and Stephen Scheinberg (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 18; 
Sargent, Extremism in America, 3. 
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monarchy, the feudal economy, and the role of the Catholic Church while the Left 
focused on creating a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and privilege, the free 
market, and autonomy from religious and cultural authority.  All other political views fell 
somewhere between the Left and the Right.  Today, political commentators associate the 
far left of this spectrum with ideologies such as communism, Maoism, and anti-
capitalism and identify the far right with nationalist, religious-extremist, and fascist 
groups.  Current literature commonly uses the terms “right-wing extremism” and “far 
right” to refer to skinhead, white supremacist, and neo-Nazi gangs and to radical-right 
political parties.17  It has been argued that the Left-Right political spectrum is 
incompatible with today’s political environment.  The political issues that had 
differentiated the Left from the Right—democracy, freedom, the role of Church and 
State, market economy, egalitarianism, pluralism, etc.—no longer correspond perfectly to 
either the Left or the Right.18  This left-right political dichotomy fails to capture the 
“multifaceted”19 nature of right-wing extremism and fails to acknowledge that it is 
“neither homogeneous nor self-contained.”20   
There is no single, agreed-upon definition of right-wing extremism.  Instead, 
right-wing extremism is characterized by attributes and themes shared by right-wing 
social movements and organizations.  These attributes and themes include (1) a sense of 
ethno-national, ideological, or religious superiority; (2) an extreme form of nationalism; 
(3) group suspicion against a strong central government; (4) a preference for militarism, 
order and authority; (5) a low regard for minority rights, egalitarian values, and political 
 
                                                 
17 Ebata, “Right-Wing Extremism,” 13. 
18 Ibid., 18. 
19 Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism, 41. 
20 Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution [Germany], “Right-Wing Extremism,” 
http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/en_fields_of_work/rightwing_extremism/ (accessed May 27, 2009).  
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and cultural pluralism; and (6) a conspiracy theory of history.21  These shared 
characteristics are not absolutes—different right-wing extremist movements emphasize 
them in distinct ways.22   
Accordingly, the terms “far right” and “right-wing extremism” in this thesis refer 
to individuals, groups, and social movements that exhibit these characteristics, albeit in 
varying degrees, and that are inclined to step outside the political system to engage in 
violent action in pursuit of their political or social objectives.  Although this thesis does 
not deal with non-violent groups, it acknowledges that the “support for terrorism is linked 
with the existence of extremist movements”23 and that non-violent groups may in the 
future resort to terrorist activities.  
C. CAUSES OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM 
There are differences between extremism, terrorism, political violence, political 
and social movements, and crime.  Nevertheless, the theories and concepts within these 
disciplines overlap and provide a substantial foundation for conceptualizing the various 
factors that contribute to the emergence of right-wing extremism.  This is appropriate as 
extremism is linked to terrorism; terrorism is a subset of political violence;24 and political 
violence is an expression of political and social movements.25  Extremism differs from 
crime due to its political and social motives, but both are driven by grievances or social 
pathologies.  A study by Joshua Freilich and William Alex Pridemore mentions six 
interrelated theories in their attempt to explain why an extremist movement emerges in 
                                                 
21 Bernt Hagtvet, “Right-Wing Extremism in Europe,” Journal of Peace Research 31, no. 3 (1994): 
241–242, http://www.jstor.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed May 2, 2009); George Michael, The Enemy of My 
Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 2006), 12–13; Cas Mudde, “Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed,” European Journal of Political 
Research 27, no. 2 (1995): 209–218, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed May 
2, 2009). 
22 Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United 
States (New York: Guilford, 1995), 7. 
23 Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism, 19. 
24 Anthony Oberschall, Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Books, 1995), 26. 
25 Donatella Della Porta, “Introduction: On Individual Motivations in Underground Political 
Organizations,” in Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations, ed. 
Donatella della Porta (Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1992), 12. 
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particular societies.  These theories are (1) relative deprivation theory, (2) social 
disorganization theory, (3) cultural and identity theory, (4) competition theory, (5) 
resource mobilization theory, and (6) political opportunity theory.26   
Relative deprivation and social disorganization theories assume that social 
structures, institutions, and control mechanisms influence behavior and, in certain 
instances, can sway individuals to adopt extremist views.  Relative deprivation theorists 
believe that uneven power distribution, economic inequalities, and social problems may 
aggravate tensions among various groups in society.27  The “primordial sentiments”28 of 
these groups can often intensify and prolong an identity-based rivalry among groups, and 
if left unchecked, these rivalries may eventually lead to a struggle between groups over 
“power, resources, rewards, and collective identity.”29  In his 1997 book Harvest of 
Rage: Why Oklahoma City is Only The Beginning, Joel Dyer noted that individuals “who 
cannot financially afford to live in [the American economic system]”30 and who belong 
to economically weakened communities that blamed the government for their 
circumstances are “most susceptible to the violent antigovernment message”31 of the far 
right.  These individuals are more inclined to join an American militia group in protest.   
 
                                                 
26 Joshua D. Freilich and William Alex Pridemore, “A Reassessment of State-Level Covariates of 
Militia Groups,” Behavioral Sciences and Law 23, no. 4 (2005): 531–535, 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed May 2, 2009).  Although Freilich and 
Pridemore specifically cite economic deprivation theory, this thesis consolidates it with other deprivation 
theories and instead uses the relative deprivation theory.  Similarly, Freilich and Pridemore specifically cite 
political competition theory, but this thesis consolidates it with other competition theories and instead uses 
the more generic term “competition theory.” 
27 Steven M. Buechler, Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and 
Cultural Construction of Social Activism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2. 
28Primordial sentiments refer to one’s sense of identity and community, which are often based on 
common ancestry, racial characteristics, ethnicity, language, region, religion, or tradition. Clifford Geertz, 
The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 261–263. 
29 Moshe Semyonov, Rebeca Raijman, and Anastasia Gorodzeisky, “The Rise of Anti-Foreigner 
Sentiment in European Societies, 1988-2000,” American Sociological Review 71, no. 3 (2006): 428, 
http://www.jstor.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed April 5, 2009).  
30 Joel Dyer, Harvest of Rage: Why Oklahoma City Is Only The Beginning (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1997), 6. 
31 Ibid., 5. 
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Social disorganization theory claims that failure of social institutions or social 
organizations (e.g., schools, businesses, law enforcement institutions) to “solve chronic 
problems”32  and the political crises that arise from such failures are likely to elicit 
extremist, anti-democratic responses.33  If a community cannot maintain order and 
enforce legal and regulatory control, some individuals will test the social controls by 
expressing their dispositions and desires, often through delinquent behavior.34  When this 
occurs, social disorganization ensues and individuals “naturally” search for a substitute, 
which may take the form of gangs, cults, and radical movements.35  Although originally 
applied to explain crime, this theory is also extendible to extremist movements, albeit in a 
slightly different formulation.  As social change disrupts traditional social groupings, 
social institutions, and social controls, and as “segments of the population are arbitrarily 
prevented from achieving their economic, political, and other goals,”36 individuals are 
left “isolated, anxious, and powerless,”37 and alienated from democratic political 
institutions.  To alleviate their “internal tensions,”38 these individuals join extremist 
movements that offer plausible, yet unrealistic solutions and that deny the legitimacy of 
the democratic political process for mediating conflict.39  In explaining crime, social 
disorganization theory points to poverty, residential mobility and its effect on community 
 
 
                                                 
32 Charis E. Kubrin and Ronald Weitzer, "New Directions in Social Disorganization Theory," Journal 
of Research in Crime and Delinquency 40, no. 4 (November 2003): 374, http://www.gwu.edu/~soc/docs/ 
Kubrin_new_directions.pdf (accessed August 31, 2009). 
33 Joseph R. Gusfield, “Mass Society and Extremist Politics,” American Sociological Review 27, no. 1 
(February 1962): 19, http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed September 1, 2009). 
34 Kubrin and Weitzer, "Social Disorganization Theory," 379. 
35 James Aho, “Christian Fundamentalism and Militia Movements in the United States,” in The 
Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International, 2006), 1:223. 
36 Earl Conteh-Morgan, Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of 
Violent Conflicts (New York: Routledge, 2004), 60. 
37 Richard F. Hamilton. Mass Society, Pluralism, and Bureaucracy: Explication, Assessment, and 
Commentary (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 1–2.  
38 Freilich and Pridemore, “State-Level Covariates,” 534. 
39 Gusfield, “Mass Society,” 22.  
 9
social controls, ethnic heterogeneity, and weak social networks as factors contributing to 
delinquent (criminal) behavior.40  Similar factors are used to explain the emergence of 
extremist groups. 
Cultural and identity theorists posit that significant changes in society may create 
“feelings of estrangement from and anger towards society” and result in subcultural 
adaptations that promote extremist movements.41  The failure of custom and tradition to 
contain or explain changes or inequities in the social structure lead to the development of 
political and religious fundamentalisms that foster negative attitudes towards and support 
exclusionary policies against minorities who pose a threat to “the collective identity and 
the cultural, national, and ethnic homogeneity of the society.”42  According to Michael 
Arena and Bruce Arrigo, the perception of racist skinheads in the United States that those 
of Aryan descent are in danger of losing their racial purity allows them to justify their 
violent extremist activities.43  Similarly, Freilich and Pridemore claim that the civil rights 
and feminist movements threatened some American white males and caused them to 
retreat to a subculture where American white male hegemony existed and where 
traditional racial, gender, and family relations were maintained.44   
Competition theorists focus on social conflict.  Social conflict is defined as “a 
struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources”45  in which “the 
parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each 
party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other.”46  It 
                                                 
40 Kubrin and Weitzer, "Social Disorganization Theory," 374. 
41 Freilich and Pridemore, “State-Level Covariates,” 531. 
42 Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky, “Anti-Foreigner Sentiment,” 428; Stan C. Weeber and 
Daniel G. Rodeheaver, “Militias at the Millennium: A Test of Smelser’s Theory of Collective Behavior,” 
Sociological Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2003): 185. http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed May 
25, 2009).  
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arises, according to competition theorists, when the political, economic, or social 
successes of a minority group threaten other groups.47  Hence, economic, social, and 
political factors, as well as an identifiable antagonist, are necessary conditions for the 
emergence of extremist groups.48   
According to Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, right-wing extremism is the 
“politics of backlash”49 that emerges in response to economic and social changes, which 
have resulted in “the displacement of some population groups from former positions of 
dominance.”50  The civil rights and feminist movements, for example, produced “an 
undercurrent of resentment against what was seen as the unfair advantages the 
government gives to people of color and women.”51  As the American political process 
made “traditional status privileges” increasingly accessible to minorities, groups of older, 
white, Protestant, straight, and male Americans became more inclined to support 
exclusionary policies and to mobilize “against equality, pluralism, and democracy.”52 
Resource mobilization and political opportunity theories both hinge on the 
assumption that there is a “steady supply of people” who are disenfranchised, and who 
have decided that the potential benefits of participation in a social movement outweigh 
the anticipated costs.53  Resource mobilization theory posits that the success of a 
movement is dependent on the movement’s ability to mobilize these groups and 
individuals.  Thus, pre-existing social networks or organizations are critical for creating 
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some degree of solidarity within marginalized groups and for mobilizing them into 
action.54  Resource mobilization theorists also acknowledge that the organization of a 
social movement and mobilization of its supporters may not develop directly from 
societal grievances, but may emerge indirectly through the moves of political actors and 
“issue entrepreneurs” who may define, create, and manipulate the grievances and sources 
of strain.55 According to this theory, Rosa Parks was not just an African-American 
woman who defied a white bus driver because her feet hurt.  She was a social activist 
who had a long history of participation in local and state chapters of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and whose friend—the 
president of the Montgomery NAACP—mobilized nineteen black ministers to initiate a 
protest against bus segregation in response to the incident.56  Currently, conservative talk 
radio57 and some American politicians58 have been accused of fulfilling the role of “issue 
entrepreneur” and of instigating right-wing disturbances.   
Political opportunity theorists focus on the relationship between social 
movements and the permissiveness of the political environment in which these 
movements occur.  They claim that the success of a social movement depends on 
opportunities created by changes in the political structure that reduce the “power 
discrepancy between authorities and challengers” and improve the challengers’ 
“bargaining power.”59  These opportunities include changes to major policy doctrines, 
electoral realignment, wars, landmark court cases, legislative reform, and efforts of the 
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political elite to directly facilitate or repress social movements.60  In addition, success is 
also dependent on the perception of movement members that the status quo is 
unacceptable, and can be changed through their own direct efforts.61  Accordingly, right-
wing extremist groups are more likely to flourish when supported—implicitly or 
explicitly—by a legitimate political party.62  For instance, in 1998, Sean O’Brien and 
Donald Haider-Markel found there are fewer right-wing militia groups in American states 
with greater Democratic Party representation in state legislatures.63  This finding is 
consistent with the perception that American militia groups are linked with the 
Republican Party.  In 1992, when Ross Perot challenged the American two-party system 
by promoting non-centrist policies, right-wing extremist groups in the United States 
became increasingly more active.64  Ross Perot’s presidential candidacy received 
relatively significant support in states where there were relatively more extreme-right 
groups.65  It has also been found that American states with weaker gun control laws have 
more right-wing paramilitary groups.  These states are viewed as providing a more 
hospitable environment for groups that stressed gun rights.66   
The various theories described above display a tendency to oversimplify reality in 
order to explain the emergence of extremist movements in terms of a particular slice of 
reality.  Each theory, in its attempt to be parsimonious, struggles to explain a specific 
type of cause—be it very general or highly specific—at the expense of the complex 
social, economic, and political environment within which the object of their study 
emerges.  For instance, relative deprivation theories fail to consider existing 
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counterterrorism measures that may inhibit terrorist groups from forming.  Similarly, a 
strong charismatic leader could still fail to mobilize a population if it believes social 
change can be accomplished through peaceful means through the political system.  In 
other words, these over-parsimonious theories may miss the forest for the trees.67  Critics 
readily point out that these theories consistently fail to explain why, when a population is 
exposed to the same stimuli, only a few individuals turn to extremism while relatively 
more individuals do not.68 
In an attempt to overcome this deficiency, DHS recently turned to an 
amalgamation of theories to warn against the possible resurgence of domestic right-wing 
extremism.  In its April 2009 report, DHS asserts that certain social, economic, and 
political circumstances may eventually lead to “confrontations between [right-wing 
extremist groups] and government authorities similar to those in the past.”  To support its 
claim, DHS points to similarities between the current socio-economic and political 
climate and that of the early 1990s when right-wing extremism grew popular due to “an 
economic recession, criticism about the outsourcing of jobs, and the perceived threat to 
U.S. power and sovereignty by other foreign powers.”  More specifically, DHS cites the 
following factors as presently encouraging right-wing extremist activity in the United 
States:69 
 economic hardship, as measured by real estate foreclosures, 
unemployment, and the inability to obtain credit;  
 perceived lack of government action on illegal immigration;  
 perceived suppression of individual liberties as represented by proposed 
gun control;  
 disgruntled military veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan;  
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 economic rise of other countries; and  
 election of the first African-American president. 
Critics of the DHS report argue that the factors identified in the report have been 
present in the U.S. for a considerable amount of time and yet the domestic far right has 
been relatively dormant.  They also argue that these identified developments do not 
necessarily encourage or trigger violent right-wing activities.  Recent surveys support the 
arguments against DHS’s assessment of the current socio-economic and political milieu.  
In July 2008, a Gallup survey revealed that Americans were less likely to take an anti-
immigration stance despite current economic downturn.70  In 2009, July and November 
polls showed that a majority of Americans believed the election of the country’s first 
African-American president improved race relations.71  Critics cite two general reasons 
why DHS appears to have arrived at the wrong conclusion.  First, its assessment was a 
result of analysis on data gathered after “an afternoon of surfing the Web.”72  And 
second, DHS fails to establish a connection between the current social, economic, and 
political environment and the variety of right-wing extremist movements and their 
disparate motivations and goals.   
D. THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 
Instead of using theories that tend to oversimplify the phenomenon of right-wing 
extremism, this thesis uses Neil Smelser’s Theory of Collective Behavior.  Within this 
framework, various theories drawn from terrorist studies, criminology, and the areas of 
political violence and social movement are employed to test the hypothesis that the 
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current social, economic, and political environment is likely to lead to a violent 
confrontation between right-wing extremist groups and government authorities.  
The Theory of Collective Behavior claims that the collective behavior is 
determined by: (1) structural conduciveness; (2) structural strain; (3) growth and spread 
of a generalized belief; (4) precipitating factors; (5) mobilization of participants for 
action; and (6) the operation of social controls.73  Structural conduciveness suggests that 
social conditions are permissive or conducive for certain types of collective behavior to 
occur.  In general, structural conduciveness can be thought of in terms of societal values 
and norms, social organization or structures (e.g., families, churches, government 
agencies, associations, political parties), and opportunities for and limitations of action as 
presented by the environment.74  For violence to arise in a society, society must either be 
permissive of violence, prohibitive of non-violent responses, or both.  If alternative 
means for expressing dissatisfaction remain open, rational actors may not opt to use 
violence to pursue their political goals and instead, decide to undertake peaceful 
demonstrations, petition, and other actions allowed by due political process.  Similarly, if 
political leaders ignore and marginalize aggrieved communities or fail to effectively 
address social issues, violent unrest may be perceived as a legitimate means to achieve 
rapid social change.75  The theories of social disorganization and of political opportunity 
reflect this notion of conduciveness or permissiveness.  
Structural strain asserts that rational actors collectively take action because 
something in wrong in their environment.  Some form of strain must be present—in 
conjunction with structural conduciveness—for collective behavior to occur.76  
Appropriately, right-wing extremist movements are responses to social, economic, and 
political developments77 that cause a group to perceive that it is systematically excluded 
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from or discriminated against something it believes is its entitlement.78  Structural strain 
leaves the community vulnerable to “recruitment and manipulation by extreme political 
movements” that promise to excise the source of the strain.79   
In his 1963 treatise on collective behavior, Smelser noted that structural strain is 
also known as “conflict,” “deprivation,” “disorganization,” “pressure,” and 
“disintegration,” among others.80  Strain is always expressed as a relation between an 
event or situation and certain cultural and individual standards.  For example, 
unemployment is not necessarily perceived as a strain if the entire economy is in a 
recession.  However, it may become a strain if one perceives his or her employment 
status is due to unfair competition from undocumented workers.  As another example, the 
inequalities between the rich and the poor are potential sources of strain in the United 
States because they are in direct conflict with the cultural value of equality of 
opportunity.  The relative deprivation, social disorganization, and the cultural and identity 
conflict theories share Smesler’s assertion that the social structure of a society must be 
conducive for extremist movements to emerge.   
In addition to structural strain as a determinant for collective behavior, Smelser 
notes the need for a generalized belief or ideology that “identifies the source of the strain, 
attributes certain characteristics to this source, and specifies certain responses to the 
strain as possible or appropriate.”  In short, collective action is not possible unless it is 
relevant and meaningful to potential actors.81  Competition theories examine the ethnic, 
religious, political, and economic cleavages that give rise to extremist movements.   
Conduciveness, strain, and a generalized belief do not by themselves produce 
extremism, but produce the context in which extremism emerges.  Collective behavior 
theorists also acknowledge the importance of precipitating events to serve as a catalyst 
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for action by providing the context toward which collective action can be directed.82  
Precipitating events may or may not be a singular event.  The antiwar movement grew 
out of response to increased military intervention in Vietnam.  Similarly, the Pro-Life 
movement emerged after the Supreme Court determined that state laws banning most 
abortions were unconstitutional.  In these instances, a single sequence of events provoked 
a response from a non-trivial group of people.  In contrast, there are no single 
precipitating events associated with the civil rights movement of the 1950s and the 
women’s movement of the 1960s.  Instead of singular events, such as sharp increases in 
racial and sexual discrimination, collective behavior theorists believe these movements 
were stimulated by a gradual change in cultural beliefs, values, aspirations, and 
expectations; a gradual change in the capacity of a society to act collectively to effect 
change; a gradual change in the opportunities for successful action; or a combination of 
any of these factors.83   
In addition to precipitating events, collective behavior requires a mobilization 
mechanism to activate members of an extremist movement.  Resource mobilization 
theories examine the various societal mobilization mechanisms that bring aggrieved 
segments of the population into action.  They examine the social movement’s leadership 
core and its organizational structure.   
The last determinant of collective behavior looks at the operation (or failure) of 
social controls.  Social controls “prevent, interrupt, deflect, or inhibit the accumulation of 
the [other collective behavior] determinants.”84  They either seek to minimize structural 
conduciveness and strain to minimize the possibility of collective action or are 
implemented after the collective behavior has erupted.  Hence, social controls are closely 
coupled to, but are distinct from structural conduciveness and strain.  The operation of 
social controls is important to political decision makers—they determine the scope, 
intensity, and duration of any collective behavior.  If properly constructed, these social 
controls can also prevent any violent escalation of extremist movements.  In this thesis, 
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social controls refer to the actions and policies of various social entities (e.g., the police, 
the courts, the press, the community leaders, and even the people themselves) that aim to 
deter the outbreak of right-wing extremist violence.   
The framework provided the determinants of collective behavior avoids the 
shortcomings inherent to the reductionist theories of relative deprivation, social 
disorganization, culture and identity, competition, resource mobilization, and political 
opportunity.  As mentioned previously, these theories, in their attempt to be 
parsimonious, struggle to explain a specific type of cause at the expense of other 
underlying conditions.  In contrast, the theory of collective behavior acknowledges that 
social, economic, and political structures and conditions may facilitate the growth of 
organized movements that may engage in terrorism, but it also holds that certain 
combinations of these determinants do not guarantee that these movements would turn to 
political violence.  This non-deterministic characteristic of collective behavior theory has 
been a source of criticism.  Nevertheless, the inability of the reductionist theories to 
predict the emergence of terrorist movements reinforces the value of identifying multiple, 
interrelated causal factors to explain the emergence of a complex phenomenon like right-
wing extremism.  The theory of collective behavior provides the framework to do this.85   
Because it uses a framework that attempts to explain collective behavior, this 
thesis will exclude from its analysis the emergence of individual right-wing terrorists.  
The radicalization of these “lone wolf offenders”86 deserves special consideration that is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND ROAD MAP 
Using the framework provided by the theory of collective behavior, this thesis 
investigates the current social, economic, and political environment of the United States 
in the context of the current health care reform debate, its influence on the domestic far 
right, and its homeland security implications.   
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Chapter II looks across nations and their extremist groups to identify significant 
conditions and dynamics that appear correlated to manifestations of right-wing 
extremism.  More specifically, this thesis examines the structural conduciveness, 
structural strain, precipitating factors, operative ideologies, resource mobilization, and the 
operation of social controls that account for the emergence of right-wing extremism in 
Italy during the 1970s, in the United States from the 1970s through the 1990s, and in 
Germany during the 1990s.  Chapter II does not consider any case of right-wing 
extremism before the end of the Second World War.  In contrast to the concerns of its 
equivalent in the inter-War and pre-War periods, the contemporary far right is not 
necessarily centered on the revival of fascist tradition.  Instead, after the political 
landscape radically changed after the Second World War, “the crisis of representation of 
established parties” and “the general distrust of politics and the democratic system” fuel 
the current-day far right.87  
Chapter III examines the various right-wing extremist groups active in the United 
States today and explores the various ideologies that drive them.  It looks at the far right’s 
xenophobic tendencies, the distrust it has towards the government, and the motivation it 
derives from Christian fundamentalism and American exceptionalism.  The concepts 
introduced in Chapter III are critical in the subsequent analysis of the American far right. 
Using the current efforts of the Obama administration to reform the health care 
system as a potential precipitating event, Chapter IV investigates the possible relationship 
between the conditions and dynamics present in contemporary United States and the 
hypothesis that it facilitates a potential resurgence in right-wing extremism.  More 
specifically, it examines the structural conduciveness of the current social, economic, and 
political environment; the dynamics of various social conflicts currently pressuring 
American society; and the effectiveness of the American far right to employ its right-
wing ideologies to broaden its public support and purse its own agenda.   
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Chapter V continues with the application of the theory of collective behavior to 
domestic right-wing extremism in the United States.  It also evaluates the operation of 
social controls on right-wing extremist mobilization and weighs their influence against 
the social structures examined in Chapter IV.  Taking into consideration the interaction 
between these determinants of collective behavior, it tests the hypothesis that the current 
social, economic, and political environment is likely to lead to a violent confrontation 
between right-wing extremist groups and government authorities.  Chapter V also 
examines the homeland security implications of this evaluation.   
Information for this thesis is derived from unclassified literature on right-wing 
extremism, to include journal articles; articles published by scholarly think tanks; 
surveys;88 books and book chapters; printed or broadcast news articles; and political 
blogs.   
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II. RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST TERRORISM IN THE  
1960s–1990s 
Extremism is linked to terrorism.  As terrorism expert Paul Wilkinson wrote, 
“Every international terrorist movement or group requires an extremist ideology or belief-
system of some kind to nourish, motivate, justify, and mobilize the use of terror 
violence.”89  Extremist organizations resort to terrorism believing these acts will help 
them achieve their political and social goals.90  This chapter looks across nations whose 
right-wing extremist groups have used acts of terror in pursuit of their objectives.  In 
doing so, this chapter attempts to significant configurations of social, economic, and 
political factors that appear to be correlated to manifestations of right-wing extremism.  
This chapter uses the framework provided by Neil Smelser’s theory of collective 
behavior, outlined in the previous chapter, to examine right-wing extremism and its 
emergence in Italy during the 1970s, the United States from the 1970s through the 1990s, 
and Germany during the 1990s.   
Although these case studies examine particular periods in these countries’ 
histories, this chapter acknowledges that right-wing violence in these countries existed 
well before and after these periods of study in response to different socio-economic and 
political contexts.  Nevertheless, the following case studies were chosen because of their 
different precipitators: right-wing extremism in Italy was a countermovement against the 
successes of the Italian communist party; the American right-wing extremist anti-abortion 
movement emerged from a conflict between judicial action and culture-religious norms; 
and German right-wing extremism was driven by xenophobic sentiments after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.  The analysis of these case studies provides a robust set of social, 
economic, political, and cultural variables with which to test the hypothesis that the 
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conditions and dynamics in contemporary United Sates are likely to lead to a violent 
confrontation between right-wing extremist groups and government authorities.  
A. ITALY, 1969–1982 
Between 1969 and 1982, Italy endured what history professor Richard Drake 
refers to as “the worst epidemic of terrorist violence in the Western world.”91  Right-wing 
violence in Italy during this period differed from that of other western and industrialized 
democracies because racial, religious, or ethnic minorities were not the targets of right-
wing extremist aggression.  A large racial or religious minority group towards which far-
right violence could be directed simply did not exist in Italy.92  Instead, right-wing 
extremism in Italy during this time period took place in a climate of political 
dissatisfaction, economic and social upheaval, and ideological confrontation.  For the 
Italian far right, the extra-parliamentary wave of protests coming from the students and 
workers’ movement in the late 1960s and the eventual integration of the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) in the mainstream political process posed a threat of communism 
and socialism.93  Initially, neo-fascist reaction to these threats took the form of “stepped-
up intimidation,”94 but it soon escalated to a terrorist campaign that began with the Piazza 
Fontana massacre of December 12, 1969, in which 17 people were killed, and another 88 
were wounded.  By 1982, Italy had suffered 12,000 to 15,000 acts of political violence.95  
From 1969 to 1974, right-wing groups dominated terrorism, maintaining a sufficiently 
high level of tension and employing false-flag tactics in an attempt to shift the blame to 
leftist terrorist groups and legitimize a coup d’état by neo-fascist sympathizers among 
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law enforcement and military establishments.96  Right-wing terrorism faded in the 
background from 1975 to 1979 when the Marxist-Leninist left-wing terrorist group 
Bigante Rosse began its terrorist campaign to force Italy to leave the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance.  However, it reemerged violently with the 
Bologna train station massacre of August 1980.97  By January 1983, Italy’s social 
controls, in the form of its repentance law and the “anti-terrorism apparatus”98 put in 
place after the assassination of Christian-Democrat President and former Prime Minister 
Aldo Moro in 1978, ended Italy’s epidemic of political violence.99 
The atmosphere in which Italy perceived right-wing extremist violence as a 
possible means to achieve social change emerged from its “blocked” political system and 
its inability to manage the country’s rapid socio-economic transformation from 1958 to 
1963, as well as the simultaneous rejection of democracy and socialism by a significant 
segment of its population.100  Like its Axis partners in the Second World War, Italy had 
the democratic political system thrust upon it.  By the 1970s, its population was 
profoundly dissatisfied with the system and its “scandal-prone, nefarious system of local 
patronage and corruption (clientelismo).”101  The inability of Italy’s pro-Western, 
democratic regime to effectively manage the country’s rapid transformation from largely 
rural and agrarian growth to urban and industrial, produced societal strains that included 
recurrent economic crisis, widespread unemployment, the transformation of the poor 
southern Italian peasantry into “an exploited urbanized proletariat in the industrial 
North,” a failing educational system, the cultural-economic crisis of the “petite 
bourgeoisie,” violent labor strikes, and deteriorating standards of living.102  Aggravating 
this dissatisfaction was the hegemonic position of the Italian Christian Democratic Party 
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that blocked any significant effort to achieve much-needed social, economic, and political 
reform.  Consequently, a significant minority—both the right- and left-wing extremists—
believed they had the responsibility to change the system and that change could not be 
accomplished “within the context of the existing rules of the game.”103   
The dissatisfaction with democracy by a significant minority was not limited to its 
inadequacies in managing the country and introducing reform.  It extended to 
democracy’s core values and political processes.  Italy’s violent past104 engendered a 
“philosophic-cultural exaltation”105 of violence that ran counter to the democratic 
processes that sought the peaceful resolution of conflicts through compromise, 
negotiation, bargaining, and rational discussion.  After its defeat in the Second World 
War, the “community of the vanquished” sought refuge in the fascist ideology that 
supported the view that violence is an acceptable instrument of social change.106  At the 
strategic level, the writings of Giulio Cesare Evola, Adriano Romualdi, and Giorgio 
Freda inspired and formed the ideological backbone of the Italian far right.  At the 
operational level, the “powerful lure of terrorism’s dark romanticism and action-packed 
lifestyle” and the inability of Italian social controls to punish terrorists attracted adherents 
and mobilized members.107  The emerging neo-fascist groups embraced “the claim of the 
superiority of elites over faceless masses” and promoted the righteousness of 
“superman’s ethics”108 over legal constraints and regulations of the existing democratic 
system.  In the minds of the neo-fascist groups, they were the elite, “standing among the 
ruins” of post-war Italy and “defiantly challenging the surrounding world.”109  These 
groups idealized the “heroism” and “self-sacrifice in a lost cause” of the Waffen SS, the 
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Islamic concept of Jihad, and the Japanese code of Bushido, and advocated a masculine 
leadership caste of elite warriors to protect the feminine society from chaos and 
disintegration.110 
The Italian far right also rejected liberalism, mass democracy, socialism, and 
communism as the decadent manifestation of the spirit.111  As capitalism spread and 
increasingly marginalized the labor force, and as the democratic government failed to 
manage the capitalist transformation of its society, the Italian far right and its supporters 
sought to reject “economic self-interest and other materialistic premises of middle class 
life.”  Furthermore, a decline in the status of religion and of the Catholic Church, and the 
moral decline of society—as manifested in the willingness of the electorate to endorse 
civil divorce and abortion—produced a “value crisis” in Italian society.  Consistent with 
social disorganization theory, as traditional Italian social institutions collapsed, 
“embattled believers in traditional institutions, symbols and ways of life” became 
vulnerable to the right-wing organizations that identified themselves as “defenders of 
European civilization threatened by the materialistic values of both Marxism and 
capitalism.”112   
The integration of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in national government, the 
labor/student demonstrations in 1968 and 1969, and the emergence of left wing terrorist 
groups such as the Red Brigades113 precipitated the violent emergence of Italian neo-
Fascist extremist groups.  As the French experiences in Indochina and Algeria and the 
growing American involvement in Vietnam reinforced the right-wing perception that the 
Communists were “fully capable of launching their schemes in Italy,”114 the Italian far 
right responded by violently countering “every street-action of the communists.”115  As 
the Left sought to “accelerate the inner disintegration of the Italian system” to produce a 
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classic Marxist-Leninist proletarian insurrection,116 the Right countered with their 
indiscriminate terrorist bombing campaign to strengthen its call for a pro-Fascist military 
coup to eliminate all leftist threats.117  As Weinberg observed, “the more closely the 
[Italian Communist Party] approached the keys to national political power and the more 
threatening the Marxist subculture appeared to anti-communists, the more serious the 
manifestations of neo-Fascist violence.”118   
Right-wing violence erupted in Italy in response to the violent, extra-
parliamentary successes of left-wing groups and the rejection of the pro-Western, 
democratic government.  Italy’s violent history and its glorification of violence to effect 
social change contradicted the principles of democracy and encouraged both left- and 
right-wing extremists to mobilize and seek redress of the deteriorating social, economic, 
and political conditions through violence.  Right- and left-wing violence fueled one 
another until the assassination of Aldo Moro spurred “the unexpected emergence of 
national consensus and renewed sense of state” and made “organized and relentless 
counterterrorism finally effective and decisive.”119   
B. THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1980s AND 1990s 
The foundations of right-wing extremism in the United States in the 1980s and 
1990s are significantly different from those of Italy.  In contrast to Italy’s experience with 
communism, the communist threat in the United States was more of an “optical illusion” 
because the United States lacked a major domestic socialist movement.  The absence of a 
socialist movement, however, did not stop Senator Joseph McCarthy and the American 
far right from “acting as if the country was in mortal danger.”120  While the emergence of 
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large communist political parties drove the rise in fascism in Italy, the American Right 
was stimulated only by its own paranoia, actively elicited by political elites.121   
Similar to the right-wing violence in the Italian case study, the targets of the 
American far right were not racial, religious, or ethnic minorities.  The United States has 
always been a nation of immigrants and although nativist groups sought to exclude 
“newer” immigrants in the 1800s, conduct, lifestyle, and “the appropriate outlook” are 
more salient in determining American national identity than race or country of origin.122  
Moreover, while racial supremacists and separatists were popular in the 1960s and 
1970s,123 the American far right dropped the tenets of biological determinism to attract a 
wider base of support.124  Thus, in the 1980s and 1990s, domestic terrorism was 
primarily driven by anti-government and anti-abortion ideologies.125  This case study 
focuses on the anti-abortion movement as the issue of abortion drove the domestic 
terrorist campaign by right-wing extremist groups through the 1980s and 1990s.   
Before Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which asserted that a woman’s right to 
obtain an abortion is constitutionally protected, the anti-abortion movement focused 
primarily to counter “a wave of permissive abortion laws” and consisted mainly of small, 
loosely connected Roman Catholic Church-sponsored groups of medical professionals 
and church leaders.126  The anti-abortion movement, driven by both religious and secular 
ideologies, surged almost immediately after the 1973 Supreme Court decision.  The 
movement initially moved into the legislative arena to attempt to overturn the Supreme 
Court decision and its initial extra-legislative activities remained “largely peaceful, 
involving picketing and other constitutionally-protected activities.”127  The movement 
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conducted educational efforts against abortion and organized political action committees 
to support anti-abortion candidates and to lobby for changes in abortion-related laws.  Its 
efforts soon escalated to other forms of tactical action, including gluing clinic locks, 
setting off stink-bombs inside clinics, harassing clinic personnel, blockading entry to 
clinics, and staging sit-ins at the clinics.128  According to the data compiled by the 
National Abortion Foundation, violence against abortion clinics and their personnel 
began in 1976 when Joseph Stockett set fire to a Planned Parenthood office in Oregon.  
Anti-abortion violence peaked in 1984 with 26 documented instances of clinic bombings 
and arsons, perpetuated by those who refused to accept incremental lobbying efforts and 
preferred direct-action tactics.  It peaked again between 1989 and 1999 with an escalation 
of arson attacks and the threatened use of anthrax against clinic personnel.  The first 
abortion provider was killed in 1993 when Michael Griffin shot to death Dr. David Gunn 
in Pensacola, Florida.129  More recently, Dr. George Tiller, the “best-known provider of 
late-term abortions”130 in the United States, was shot and killed in his church in Wichita, 
Kansas on May 31, 2009. 
The permissiveness—or what collective behavior theorists would call “structural 
conduciveness”—of American society with regards to anti-abortion violence between 
1970 and 2000 came in the form of the attitudes formed by religious norms and by 
implicit approval by politicians.  Mainstream religion formed the backbone of legislative 
anti-abortion efforts with virtually all initial anti-abortion efforts driven by the leadership 
of the American Catholic Church.131  As religious doctrines stress the protection of life, it 
should be no surprise that individual religiosity influences abortion attitudes and such 
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attitudes shape abortion restrictions and access.132  On the extreme, violent religious 
fundamentalists vowed to end legalized abortion by any means necessary.133  Drawing on 
religious dogma, they justified their anti-abortion position as “sacred and just” and 
demonized pro-lifers as “evil and profane.”  This Manichean mindset, which also equated 
abortion with the Nazi holocaust and women having abortions as “murderers” and “baby 
killers,”134 made violence against abortion clinic personnel and pro-life supporters more 
likely. 
The implicit approval of politicians towards anti-abortion violence also created a 
somewhat risk-free environment for anti-abortion extremists.  After the 1973 Supreme 
Court decision, the legislative and executive branches appeared complicit to, and even 
supportive of, the anti-abortion movement’s aim to “erect as many obstacles as possible 
between a woman and a legal abortion.”135  In 1976, the anti-abortion lobby achieved 
their first major victory when Congress passed the Hyde Amendment, which imposed 
restrictions on government funding for abortion and abortion-related services.  Then in 
1983, President Ronald Reagan penned an anti-abortion essay titled “Abortion and the 
Conscience of the Nation” in The Human Life Review.  Some anti-abortion extremists 
interpreted this essay “as endorsement and legitimization of private law enforcement and 
vigilantism.”136  Consequently, the essay promoted a “drastic increase”137 in abortion-
related violence.  In the seven years prior to the publication, there had been a yearly 
average of less than three bombing and arson attacks against abortion clinics.  The year 
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after the essay was published, 26 such attacks were witnesses.138  Not only did President 
Reagan fail to condemn the spike in violence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was 
reluctant to label the bombings as “terrorism,” claiming that the acts of violence did not 
fit into their definition of terrorism.  Very few people were arrested and prosecuted for 
clinic bombings, and no significant government efforts were made to investigate the 
church and anti-abortion groups, who contributed to the perpetuators’ violent attitude.139  
Moreover, pro-life leaders avoided condemning clinic bombers as extremists140 and, in 
some cases, commented that although they did not approve of the violence, “[they were] 
glad it happened” because “violence begets violence.”141  Although one cannot prove a 
direct cause-and-effect relationship between the political and religious leadership’s 
failure to condemn anti-abortion violence and the rise of abortion-related violence, there 
is an evident correlation in the decline of violence following President Reagan’s eventual 
public condemnation of it on January 3, 1985.142   
When pro-choice President William J. Clinton assumed office in 1992, the 
structural conduciveness shifted from tacit political approval to political frustration.  
Once in office, President Clinton quickly lifted the abortion restrictions imposed by the 
anti-abortion administrations of Reagan and Bush.  Consequently, as anti-abortionist 
activists concluded that they could not achieve their goals within the political process of a 
pro-choice administration, violence against clinics escalated.143  At the same time 
President Clinton was elected into office, Randall Terry and other Operation Rescue 
doctors launched their violent “No Place to Hide” campaign against abortion clinic 
workers and their families.  Militant anti-abortionists issued death threats and obtained 
abortion clinic workers’ home addresses, itineraries, and the location of their children 
with the intent of reducing the “supply” of abortion doctors.144  In March 1993, abortion 
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doctor, David Gunn, was assassinated by activist Michael Griffin.  In August 1993, 
George Tiller, another abortion doctor, was shot and injured by Rachelle Shannon.  
Eleven months later, Reverend Paul Hill, who defended Michael Griffin’s use of lethal 
force against doctors, shot and killed John Bayard Britton and one of his clinic escorts.145  
Eventually, the direct action taken by militant anti-abortionists produced a backlash from 
the Supreme Court, Congress, and the executive branch.  In 1994, Supreme Court issued 
a ruled that anti-abortion advocates who were “loosely connected” to the violent activists 
could be held legally liable.146  Later that year, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrance 
Act was passed into law and added federal civil and criminal penalties to the crimes of 
blockading or vandalizing clinics.  As it became increasingly politically incorrect to 
attack Roe v Wade, the anti-abortionist movement found itself at a crossroads.  Some 
members continued to advocate violence, while others quickly reevaluated their 
tactics.147 
The social conflict—also known as “structural strain”—produced by the abortion 
debate was driven by both religious and secular norms.  According to Blanchard and 
Prewitt in their study of anti-abortion bombers and arsonists, “all were religiously 
ardent.”148  However, the abortion issue transcended moral theology149 and established, 
in some respects, stronger ties to the feminist movement.  Kristen Luker’s 1984 study of 
200 pro-life and pro-choice activists reveals that anti-abortion women believe “men are 
best suited for the public world of work, and women to the private world of rearing 
children, managing homes, and caring for husbands.”  In contrast, pro-choice women 
believe men and women are fundamentally equal in regards to rights and responsibilities.  
Thus, anti-abortion women are motivated by a concern maintaining their ability to rely on 
their husbands to support their social roles as mothers, while pro-choice women primarily 
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want to maintain their independent status.150  In the view of political scientist Rosalind 
Petchesky, “abortion politics had more to do with compulsory heterosexuality, family 
structure, the relationship between men and women and parents and children, and 
women’s employment.”151  Consistent with the view that the feminist movement 
challenged male dominance in the family and the work place, anti-abortion violence was 
also found to be perpetuated by a small group of “abortion warriors”152 who belonged to 
a subculture that emphasized “traditional, patriarchal gender relations,” sought to “control 
women,” and tolerated violence against women.153  In a sense, the anti-abortion 
movement can be seen as a response to the feminist movement in the same way the right-
wing violence in Italy between 1969 and 1982 was a response to left-wing violence. 
The far right has also adopted the pro-life rhetoric of mainstream religions, 
equating abortion as murder and equating it as “the American Holocaust.”  In addition, its 
anti-abortion is supported by its linkage to race.  On the one hand, the far right seeks to 
stop abortion “at least among white women” to increase the White birth rate.  On the 
other, it declares that abortion is a tool to “eliminate the hundreds of thousands of 
illegitimate blacks.”154  While not all anti-abortion activists are racists, the issue does 
motivate elements of the far right.   
Right-wing violence against clinic personnel and facilities escalated after anti-
abortion advocates failed to make substantial progress within the political process to 
reverse the Supreme Court’s assertion of a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.  Initially, 
the violent anti-abortion activists were encouraged by what was interpreted as a tactic 
approval from the executive branch and complicit support of religious and secular 
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leaders.  Anti-abortion violence subsided when the executive, judicial, and legislative 
branches of government installed effective social controls that forced anti-abortion 
activists to reevaluate their tactics.  
C. REUNIFIED GERMANY IN THE 1990s 
Prior to reunification, right-wing extremism was a “marginal phenomenon”155 in 
western Germany for several reasons.  First, the creation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1949 and its adoption of constitutional and institutional measures 
discouraged the re-emergence of far right extremism in Western Germany.  Second, the 
economic boom facilitated by the Marshall Plan denied the “economic conditions for a 
thriving radical right-wing party.”  Third, the Bonn party system was “flexible enough 
collectively” to accommodate most political views in the new Republic while rejecting 
both left- and right-wing extremism.  And fourth, when radical right-wing political 
parties did emerge, they were subjected to factionalism that constrained their electoral 
potential.156  In short, the social structures present in pre-unified Germany simply did not 
allow right-wing extremism to flourish. 
Despite being marginalized after the end of the Second World War, the German 
far right did attempt to inject itself into the German political sphere before 1990.  The far 
right first attempted to assert its views in 1949 with the formation of the far-right political 
parties.  However, these political parties failed to garner the necessary electoral support 
to make a significant impact in German politics until fifty years later.  In 1989, the 
political right finally gained traction when the Republikaner party grabbed six 
parliamentary seats as a result of a general rejection of established politics.157  There 
were also other far-right initiatives that attempted social change outside of the democratic 
political process.  In 1980, for example, in response to a wave of asylum seekers and 
ethnic German resettlers from East Europe, a “citizens initiative” attempted to stop the 
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migration of non-natives to North-Rhine Westphalia.  Then in 1982, a group of fifteen 
prominent scholars issued the Heidelberg Manifesto that called for the defense of German 
culture and society.  These efforts received little public support.158  The political and 
social environment, amid concerns that Germany might return to its Third Reich policies, 
simply did not permit an outward demonstration of discontent and hostility toward 
foreigners.  Anyone who dared to criticize or question the policies governing immigration 
and guest workers were charged with Fremdenfeindlichkeit—xenophobic animosity 
toward strangers.159   
The “unparalleled”160 rise in right-wing extremism in Germany in the 1990s is 
attributed to the extraordinary social changes brought about by the collapse of 
communism, the reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990, and the phenomenon of 
economic globalization.161  These events ushered in a social, economic, and political 
context that promoted xenophobia and racism and allowed right-wing extremism to 
flourish and find expression in violence against foreigners162—German political 
leadership consistently failed to address emerging socio-economic issues effectively;163 
public discourse was inhibited by a lack of legitimate political forums that promoted open 
and honest debate;164 and political leaders—in pursuit of their own political agenda—
propagated and encouraged a belief that blamed foreigners and immigrant workers as the 
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causes of unemployment, crime, rising social welfare expenditures, and other social and 
economic issues.165  Within this context, affected Germans began to latch onto a 
“Germany for Germans”166 sentiment and onto right-wing extremist organizations that 
acted as the protector of the threatened German community.167  Consequently, incidents 
of proven or suspected right-wing violence quintupled from 209 in 1990 to 1,492 in 1991 
and peaked at 2,693 incidents in 1992.168  While most attacks targeted asylum seekers 
and immigrants, their property, and their residences, the attacks were also directed at 
Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, memorials to World War II and the Holocaust, left-
wing groups, handicapped persons, homosexuals, and the homeless.169   
The constitutional ban on right-wing political parties, which served to restrain the 
activities of right-wing activists prior to reunification, may have encouraged the breakout 
of anti-foreigner violence.  Without a political forum to openly discuss the immigration 
issue and because they were denied direct access to public media and to political parties, 
the German far right sought other means to attract attention.170  As the German political 
right continued to fail to advance their objectives using politically acceptable means, 
extremist groups turned to German public media coverage to promote their movement via 
attacks against foreigners. Not only did German media provide an “ideal stage” to 
discount the stigma of and taboos against right-wing ideologies, it eventually forced 
politicians to confront the issues as it shaped public opinion and garnered public support 
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by attributing some degree of legitimacy to the violence.171  As a measure of the 
prevailing anti-foreigner sentiment and of the dissatisfaction with the established political 
parties in handling the asylum and refugee issue, electoral support for political parties 
that maintained anti-foreigner positions and emphasized the importance of 
Volksgemeinschaft172 peaked at 8.7 percent in 1992.173  Although this percentage is 
relatively small, the successes of the openly rightist political parties to steal votes away 
from the more moderate parties eventually forced the latter to adopt stricter anti-
immigrant policies.174 
The social changes introduced by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
reunification of Germany, and globalization may have also encouraged right-wing 
extremist activism by producing structural strain in the form of high unemployment rates, 
increased job and housing competition, and failed social institutions and services.  Daniel 
Maier-Katkin, Susanne Stemmler, and Paul Stretesky point to the East Germany city of 
Rostock to illustrate the effects of reunification on the former East Germany.  Rostock 
was relatively prosperous but after reunification, its economy collapsed because its 
industries were not competitive.175  This economic collapse triggered widespread 
unemployment, an increase in the demand for and reliance on welfare and unemployment 
compensation, and the deterioration of social institutions and services:   
Many social clubs collapsed because of lack of funds and community 
support.  New facilities, such as fitness centers and gambling clubs 
emerged, but these [were] expensive avocations. … Public transportation 
became more expensive…. Income increased for those who continued to 
work; but the unemployed (including pensioners) lost purchasing power as 
prices rose to (or even beyond) Western levels.… Rents more than 
doubled.  Overall, the quality of life … declined substantially: residents 
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lost work, social contacts, social services, familiar relationships, and 
leisure time activities.  Housing, which had been adequate when supported 
by the social services of the old [communist] system, grew stark and 
became for young people a “prison without walls.”176 
West Germans were also negatively affected by reunification.  Reunification 
increased the size of Germany’s labor force with the introduction of East German 
workers into the FGR.  In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 
resulting migration of expellees and refugees from Eastern and Central Europe 
exacerbated the socio-economic situation.  Also, aggravating the job market were the 
effects of globalization.  In the early 1990s, globalization forced Germany to shift its 
manufacturing sector out of Germany and into lower-wage countries causing the German 
manufacturing sector to lose 1.2 million jobs.  Between 1990 and 1993, the number of 
registered unemployed increased from roughly 250,000 to more than 1.1 million.  In 
short, reunified Germany industry could not absorb the “excess of relatively skilled and 
disciplined labor.”177  These events raised job competition between native Germans and 
migrants and led to tax increases to offset the costs of unification178   
As the social and economic consequences of reunification became apparent, the 
German populace began to harbor antagonistic sentiments against asylum seekers, 
immigrant workers, and ethnic German migrants who they believed were depriving 
native Germans of jobs, housing, social services, and economic benefits.  The 
demonization of foreigners and the emergence of xenophobic tendencies against them 
were reinforced by the release of government studies that clearly correlated the foreign 
population with crime, unemployment, and welfare recipients.179  By September 1991, 69 
percent of West Germans and 64 percent of East Germans supported harsher immigration 
laws.180  Fifteen months later, 75 percent of Germans believed asylum and foreigner 
problems were the most important issues confronting Germany.   
                                                 
176 Maier-Katkin, Stemmler, and Stretesky, “Immigration,” 10. 
177 Betz, “The German Model Reconsidered,” 308, 315–316. 
178 Roberts, “Right-Wing Radicalism,” 340. 
179 Chapin, Germany for Germans, 54-63; Kühnel, “Hitler’s Grandchildren,” 158. 
180 Chapin, Germany for Germans, 62. 
 38
The failure of German social controls to contain the violent, anti-foreigner riots as 
they broke out reinforced the permissiveness of German society towards right-wing 
extremism.  In the “most dramatic incident of the period,”181 which involved the 
southeastern German industrial town of Hoyerswerda, the far right saw “for the first 
time” that “violence could be used as an efficient means of asserting political goals:”182  
Eight skinheads assaulted several Vietnamese in the downtown area.  
After the police intervened, thirty-two more skinheads joined in.  They 
proceeded to the nearby asylum hostel, where approximately seventy guest 
workers from Mozambique and Vietnam were staying, and began 
throwing Molotov cocktails.  As the conflict continued into the next day, 
the skinheads were encouraged by the applause of local residents.  In the 
following days, the skinheads continued their attacks…. Under the 
pressure of the ongoing violence, the asylum-seekers were evacuated in 
buses.183   
The instrumental value of violence against foreigners demonstrated by the Hoyerswerda 
incident emboldened the far right.  It reinforced their belief that they had the power and 
ability to dislodge foreigners from their communities.  In addition, despite most Germans 
opposing the direct action taken against immigrants, violent German right-wing extremist 
groups were encouraged by what could have been considered tacit approval and support 
for their actions—a lackluster police action against the perpetuators, applause from local 
residents, and the failure of German politicians to condemn the violence.184 
Consequently, the experience of Hoyerswerda was repeated in other cities during the rest 
of the year, including Zittau, Halle, and Cottbus.185   
Subsequent changes to Germany’s asylum policy to address the immigration issue 
dramatically decreased in the flow of asylum seekers into Germany, which in turn 
placated those who had been taking aggressive action against foreigners.  The formation 
of special police units to protect immigrants, special commissions to synchronize 
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government efforts against anti-foreigner violence, and the strengthening of criminal law 
to deter neo-Nazi activity also reduced the structural conduciveness that fostered right-
wing extremist violence.  Moreover, mainstream political parties took measures to 
publicly tie the right-wing Republikaner political party to the anti-foreigner violence and 
to identify it as extremist.  As Republikaner’s national socialistic tendencies and 
antidemocratic nature were emphasized and as the established political parties began 
taking a firmer stance on immigration and immigration-related issues, public support for 
the right-wing political parties and violence against foreigners dropped.186 
Right-wing extremism flourished in Germany after the precipitating events of 
German reunification, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the advancement of 
globalization.  These events created social, economic, and political strain on the German 
populace who eventually identified asylum seekers and immigrant workers as the cause 
of their domestic troubles.  In addition, the lack of political and cultural forums to address 
the immigration issue and effectively reduce the strain felt by the populace also 
facilitated the decision of right-wing activists to mobilize and resort to violent attacks 
against foreigners in order to achieve social change.  Their initial success, brought about 
by lukewarm police action and coupled by the failure of politicians to condemn the 
violence, reinforced their perception that desirable social change could be attained 
through their actions.  The eventual implementation of stronger social controls reduced 
the anti-foreigner violence and diminished public support for right-wing activists. 
D. SUMMARY 
When the determinants of collective behavior—structural conduciveness, 
structural strain, growth and spread of a right-wing extremist ideology, precipitating 
factors, mobilization of participants for action, and the operation (or failure) of social 
controls to minimize or counter the other determinants—produce an appropriate set of 
conditions and dynamics, right-wing extremism emerges and flourishes.  As shown in the 
case studies, societal permissiveness towards right-wing extremism may take different 
forms.  In Germany and Italy, the lack of political and social forums to address legitimate 
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grievances drove a significant minority of their society to seek social change through 
violent means.  The refusal of German politicians to acknowledge and address their 
immigration problem prompted right-wing extremists to violently eject foreigners from 
their communities.  The blocked Italian political system forced left- and right-wing 
groups to initiate social change through political violence.  In the United States, a 
perverse interpretation of religious and civil norms provided theological and legal 
justification for right-wing violence against abortion clinics and their personnel.  And in 
all three countries, the complicity of politicians and reluctance of law enforcement 
agencies to prosecute the perpetuators of right-wing violence provided a relatively risk-
free environment that permitted right-wing extremists to execute their operations.  When 
these countries employed the appropriate social controls in the form of specialized police 
units, legislative measures to criminalize right-wing violence, and public outreach 
campaigns and public condemnation by significant community leaders, the structural 
conduciveness in their societies was reduced and the spread of far right violence was 
inhibited.   
Right-wing extremism also emerges in society as a response to social, economic, 
and political developments that leaves the society vulnerable to the appeal of extremist 
rhetoric.  Societal strain, produced by either internal or external circumstances, may take 
the form of frustrations resulting from non-responsive, inefficient, or repressive 
government policies. Economic hardships and social disorganization can also produce 
societal strain.  In the cases of Italy and Germany, political dissatisfaction and the 
absence of redress of social and economic grievances or frustration motivated right-wing 
extremism.  In the United States, the passage of legislation that conflicted with the norms 
of a significant minority provoked a right-wing extremist response.   
Before structural conduciveness and strain foments into right-wing extremism, a 
generalized belief or ideology must make it meaningful to the potential actors.  This 
ideology identifies the source of the strain and identifies appropriate and possible 
responses to the strain.  In the case studies, this ideology or generalized belief manifested 
itself in the form racist ideologies, in religious or cultural norms, and in the formation of 
the demonized “other.”  In Italy, the far right demonized the failing democratic 
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government and the Italian left in order to mobilize its members and pursuit its own 
social and political agenda.  In the United States, clinic personnel and their supporters 
were targeted for their role in abortions by activists who equated abortion to murder.  
And in reunified Germany, foreigners were perceived as the cause of social ills 
experienced by the far right.  In each study, violence against the other was perceived to 
be an effective and rational instrument to reduce the strain.   
Each case of right-wing extremism was triggered by a precipitating event or by a 
set of conditions that pushes a significant minority into action.  In the cases of Germany 
and of Italy, the precipitating event occurred outside society’s control.  In the American 
context, the trigger took the form of the 1973 Supreme Court decision.  Once society 
found itself beyond the “tipping point,” the right-wing extremism emerged with the 
mobilization of right-wing adherents.  In Germany and in Italy, this was achieved by the 
mobilization of the countries’ historic fascist groups.  In the United States, religious 
institutions provided the backbone of non-violent support, but their condemnation of 
abortion using apocalyptic terminology prevented them from controlling the action of a 
violent sub-movement.   
The chosen case studies support the assertion that the theory of collective 
behavior is valuable to understanding how right-wing extremism emerges and flourishes 
in a particular society.  They also provide insight as to how the determinants of collective 
behavior can be manifested in society.  These insights will be useful in Chapter IV when 
the thesis explores the contemporary United States and tests the hypothesis that the 
current social, economic, and political environment is likely to lead to a violent 
confrontation between right-wing extremist groups and government authorities.  
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III. RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
The attacks against landmarks of American economic and military strength on 
September 11, 2001, brought terrorism to the forefront of the American psyche.  For 
many Americans, the terrorist attacks seemed unprecedented; but in reality, terrorism is 
nothing new to the country.  There have been over 3,000 terrorist incidents and more than 
700 terrorism-related fatalities within the United States and Puerto Rico since 1954.187  
However, the 9/11 attacks were unprecedented in terms of the number of civilian deaths 
and the amount of destruction produced.  Moreover, these terrorist attacks triggered “the 
most comprehensive reorganization ever taken by the federal government,”188 resulting 
in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the alteration of the 
socio-economic and political environment within which the country combats 
terrorism.189  
This chapter takes a look at the far right in contemporary United States.  As the 
previous case studies noted, right-wing extremist groups resorted to violence against 
certain groups of people when legitimate forms of redress failed to produce the change 
they desired.  Right-wing extremists, through the lenses of their ideologies, identified the 
source of their social woes and established violence as an effective and rational 
instrument capable of redressing their grievances.  This chapter examines the various 
right-wing extremist groups in contemporary United States and explores the various 
ideologies that drive them.  These ideologies will be used in the subsequent chapter, in 
conjunction with the framework provided by the theory of collective behavior and the 
insights gleaned from the cases studied in Chapter II, to test the hypothesis that the 
current conditions and dynamics present in the United States may lead to a violent 
confrontation between right-wing extremist groups and government authorities.  
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A. THE AMERICAN FAR RIGHT  
In his book White Rage: The Extreme Right and American Politics, conflict 
analyst Martin Durham asserts that there is “no one moment that the modern extreme 
right came into existence.”190  Nevertheless, the history of violent right-wing extremist 
movements in the United States is long and well-documented.  In the 1800s, it was a 
struggle against Catholics during the Irish immigration.  Chinese-Americans were first 
excluded in 1882 and then were massacred in Rock Springs, Wyoming, in 1885.  After 
the Civil War, right-wing extremism manifested itself as a predominantly anti-black 
movement in the South, championed by the Ku Klux Klan.  Then during World War I, it 
reemerged in the form of anti-Semitism, reaching a high point as did hostility against 
German-Americans.191  Racial supremacy and separatism were popular in the 1960s and 
1970s.  However, after the American far right reduced its emphasis on the tenets of 
biological determinism to attract a wider base of support,192  domestic right-wing 
extremism became primarily driven by anti-government and anti-abortion ideologies.193  
More recently, centralized and big government has been the focus of the far right, 
although racism still influences the far right.194    
The study of American right-wing extremism is complicated, because the 
phenomenon is not monolithic.  Right-wing extremist organizations do not necessarily 
subscribe to only one ideology and a right-wing extremist does not necessarily belong to 
only one group.195  Some turn to the Bible, some to the Constitution, and others to Mein 
Kampf.  Some extremists “see a tyrannical and corrupt government and a bureaucracy run 
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wild as their enemy,” others target homosexuals or racial and ethnic minorities.196  
Furthermore, a right-wing extremist organization may consist of factions that may or may 
not profess the same ideology.  To illustrate this point, investigative journalist Chip 
Berlet and historian Matthew Lyons note that although some militia groups are openly 
racist and anti-Semitic, others are simply extremist patriots.197  In his study of American 
right-wing violence, history professor Jeffrey Kaplan cites a 1990 narrative that illustrates 
the factions within the racist skinhead movement: 
The skins [skinheads] are really split up right now.  There are COTC 
[Church of the Creator] skins… And there are Odinist skins and there are 
Atheist skins.  And then comes the two factions I don’t agree with.  I don’t 
consider these two as anything but confused.  Identity skins, they are 
contradictive idiots that don’t deserve to wear our clothing or haircuts… 
And then the biggest enemy under the code of skins: SHARP (Skinheads 
Against Racial Prejudice).198   
Despite the divisive and competitive factions within extreme right-wing 
organizations, literature continues to treat these organizations as cohesive units and 
examine the far right along organization lines.  Kaplan, for example, categorizes the 
extreme right into Ku Klux Klan groups, Christian Identity believers, Neo-Nazi groups, 
Reconstructed Traditions (i.e., Odinism and Ásatrú), Idiosyncratic sectarians (i.e., COTC 
and assorted Survivalists), and the “catch-all” Single Issue Constituencies.199  History 
professor Stephen Scheinberg looks at the Militia, the Liberty Lobby, Christian 
Extremists, Jewish Extremists, and Black Extremists, as well as the Klan and the 
Skinheads.200  Law enforcement veteran Timothy Baysinger treats the American far right 
as a constellation of the Christian Identity Movement, Militas, Sovereign Citizens, Ku 
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Klux Klan, Neo-Nazis, and Skinheads.201  Undeniably, there are academic benefits to 
study individual right-wing organizations.  Depending on the particular issue being 
considered, for example, these groups do maintain predictable positions on what they 
believe government agencies and elected officials ought to accomplish.202  However, 
these typologies ignore the shared beliefs and the shared members of these organizations.  
They also fail to consider that, as society evolves, these organizations struggle for 
influence and attempt to attract a broader base of support by reshaping their ideologies to 
explain their success and failures, by harmonizing its ideological base with the new 
conditions, and by mobilizing its current members.203   
Although the American far right involves numerous organizations, a multitude of 
committed activists, and many more supporters, they are unified by a set of attributes and 
themes, albeit to varying degrees.  Since overt racism became stigmatized by popular 
culture, according to sociologist Sara Diamond, the preoccupations of the “modern” 
American far right have been with protecting “free market” or “libertarian” capitalism; 
promoting anticommunism and U.S. military hegemony over the rest of the world; and 
preserving traditional morality and supreme status for native-born white male Americans 
and for the nuclear family.204    
B. RIGHT-WING EXTERMIST IDEOLOGIES  
Every violent extremist movement or group requires an ideology or belief system 
“to nourish, motivate, justify, and mobilize [its] use of terror violence.”205  As 
perceptions of the social, economic, and political milieu are filtered and shaped by this 
ideology, what terrorists believe affects their decision to employ violence as a means to 
achieve their social and political goals.206  According to sociologist Neil Smelser, an 
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ideology performs a variety of functions.  First, it identifies and explains what is wrong 
or what is being threatened.  Second, an ideology identifies an entity (individual or 
group) as being responsible for the dangers to and suffering of a given group.  It also 
portrays this entity as having distinctive characteristics (e.g., of a different race or 
ethnicity), motives, and hostile intentions.  Third, an ideology offers a vision of a better 
society and better life.  Fourth, it portrays the enemy as both omnipotent and weak.  It 
characterizes its adherents as weak victims of the powerful enemy, but acknowledges 
their potential “to destroy even the most powerful enemies.”  And fifth, an ideology 
harmonizes seemingly contradictory events within a consistent framework.  It justifies 
decisions to employ violence “through the glorification of the moral, political, or 
religious cause” and through the vilification of the enemy.  It also reconciles events and 
situations that appear contradictory to its worldview.207 
A right-wing ideology is necessary, but not sufficient, to produce and nurture 
right-wing extremism.  A large part of a community may be exposed to right-wing 
ideology, but only a few individuals act upon it.  Ideology is just one of the determinants 
of collective behavior.  It provides meaning to the social conflicts (aka structural strain) 
experienced by society and—if permitted by inadequate or absent social controls—
facilitates and justifies action, both violent and non-violent.  Functional ideologies within 
right-wing extremist movements also provide an insight as to what mechanism 
government and law enforcement agencies can be employed to preempt any violent 
outburst.  Thus, it is essential to analyze the content and structure of the belief-system of 
right-wing extremist organizations.208  The following discussion will focus on three 
major schools of thought found in a variety of American right-wing extremist 
organizations: racism; distrust in the government; and Christian fundamentalism and its 
secular cousin, American exceptionalism.  To be fair, it must be noted that these 
ideologies do not necessarily advocate violence and may be shared by non-violent groups 
and individuals who, because of their rejection of violence as a means to social change, 
cannot be classified as associated with the American far right. 
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The first right-wing ideology to be discussed is racism.  Racism is a belief that 
race is the “primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences 
produce an inherent superiority of a particular race.”209  There are two categories of 
right-wing extremist movements that are predominantly based on a racial ideology: racial 
supremacism and racial separatism.  Racial supremacist movements revolve around the 
notion that one’s race is inherently superior to other racial and ethnic minorities.210  They 
argue that the enemy, who is external to one’s own racial group, must be subjugated 
socially, economically, and politically.  Accordingly, supremacist adherents seek social 
change through a struggle for supremacy of one nation or race over others and their 
efforts, both violent and non-violent, are justified as a means to achieve and safeguard 
racial dominance.  They see power as the ultimate goal and as achievable by seizing 
“control of the state.”211  Organized white supremacist groups in the United States 
evolved from their historic base of various predecessor Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazi 
organizations.212  Over time, they devolved into a wide range of competing forms and 
ideologies.  Historical and contemporary white supremacist groups include National 
Alliance, White Aryan Resistance, National Socialist Movement, White Revolution, 
Volksfront, and National Vanguard.213  Other supremacist groups include the New Black 
Panther Party for Self-Defense, Nation of Yahweh, and the Israelite Church of God in 
Jesus Christ. 
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In contrast to racial supremacists, racial separatist movements reject the notion of 
racial superiority.  Instead, they advocate the territorial separation of their race from 
others to “save” and develop their own distinct cultural identity.214  Separation—not 
segregation, which is seen as a temporary solution—is accomplished by “carving out a 
separate state.”215  Separatists do not consider themselves as part of the broader 
population, but as a separate entity.  Additionally, they believe that their values are the 
only ones of real significance and criticize others who do not support them.  They foster 
in-group love and demonstrate hatred toward the out-group.  Furthermore, separatists 
emphasize the significance of their racial purity, condemn interracial marriage, and 
display symbols of pride and of a “glorious past.”216   
The first recorded proposals for relocating black Americans to “separate lands” 
either within the United States or in a separate country were made by white Americans in 
the 18th and 19th centuries.  Both Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln advocated 
territorial separation and proposed that black Americans “leave the country and settle 
elsewhere.”217  In a speech on December 1, 1963, Malcom X echoed the same proposal 
and suggested that if it was infeasible, then “America must set aside some separate 
territory here in the Western Hemisphere, where the two races can live apart from each 
other.”218  The Nation of Islam and the Black Panthers are examples of black separatist 
organizations.   
Supremacy and separatism are related in the sense that they are both race-centric 
and share historic origins.219  The distinction between the two movements blur when 
members of separatist groups possess supremacist beliefs.  For example, the Ku Klux 
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Klan has historically supported separatist proposals, albeit for supremacist reasons.220  
However, in the United States, white separatist groups tend to expand their influence not 
by appealing to racial distinctions, but through “argument and rational discourse aimed at 
[white Americans] who have become embittered or aggrieved over what they perceive to 
be a host of racial double standards.”221  Moreover, although white separatists reject 
violence and intimidation tactics of supremacists,222 the xenophobic tendencies of white 
separatists can manifest as “defensive hate crimes.”223  In their view, when their 
community, their employment status, or their cultural identity is threatened by outsiders, 
they are thusly justified and obligated to remove the ethnic minorities from their 
perceived domain.224  Sociologists Betty Dobratz and Stephanie Shanks-Meile cite the 
following factors that have contributed to white separatist activity: (1) increase of 
nonwhite immigrants, (2) decline in high wage jobs for unskilled labor, (3) white 
resentment over affirmative action policies, (4) continuing high black-on-white violent 
crime rates, (5) growing acceptance of multiculturalism, (6) rising expectations of 
minorities, and (7) the growth of the use of the Internet.225 
The racist ideology of the far right has not been able to get much traction in 
mainstream America, at least not overtly.  The racist attitudes held by segments of the 
domestic far right clash with the multi-culturalistic worldview held by the majority of 
Americans.226  While the racist right feels the need to engage in identity-based 
opposition, the “strong [social] codes against the direct expression of racist views”227 acts 
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as a restraint against their actions, threatening them with “constant ire and indignation”228 
from the public if they openly reveal their beliefs.  Even those who subconsciously hold 
stereotyped images of minority groups tend to distance themselves from individuals who 
are openly racist and who they view as either uneducated or psychologically disturbed.229  
Nonetheless, while the stigma associated with racism has limited the public’s acceptance 
of it as a normal and legitimate ideology, a hate crime has been committed every hour of 
every day over a span of a decade.230  In response to the social constraints against overt 
racism, far right adherents to white supremacist or white separatist beliefs mask their 
actions with a form of American exceptionalism wherein “American” becomes 
synonymous with “white.”231   
The second ideology that drives right-wing extremists is a distrust in centralized 
authority, as embodied by a strong federal government.  Underlying this mistrust of the 
federal government is an extreme libertarian ideology.  In their view, the government is 
only tolerated as the “direct expression of the citizens’ will.”232  The government should 
not intervene in or regulate the economic transactions of individuals, should not attempt 
to distribute wealth among social classes, and should simply allow “whatever distribution 
pattern” emerges through natural market forces.  Right-wing groups can be either 
oppositional or system-supportive, depending on the policy issue and its relationship with 
the group’s ideology. For example, libertarians are generally opposed to any 
protectionism policies, but have supported state intervention when it benefited the upper 
class.233  In addition, the American Right has always been opposed to anti-discrimination 
measures to protect the civil rights of ethnic minorities and homosexuals, but has been a 
reliable supporters of the state in the realm of foreign and military policy.234   
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Right-wing extremists insist that the federal government seeks to deprive its 
citizens of their fundamental rights.  Gun control legislation, for example, is perceived to 
threaten the right to own and possess firearms as protected by the Second Amendment 
and is considered to be the federal government’s attempt to “disarm the American 
people.”235  In their early years, right-wing militia groups were preoccupied with the 
danger of an “imminent” communist invasion and the certainty of a communist takeover 
from within the United States.236  Today, they are fueled by a conspiracy theory that 
claims “a master plan exists to undermine U.S. sovereignty, confiscate the people’s 
firearms, and impose a United Nations-directed dictatorship on the world.”237  
Accordingly, most militias are created as “citizen defense organizations” under the 
auspices of the Second Amendment with the mission to “protect their communities 
against federal law enforcement agents, the United States military [and] foreign soldiers 
who will invade the United States.”238   
Certain groups within the far right do not recognize any federal or state authority 
and claim they “are not subject to any laws to which they have not specifically 
consented.”239  These groups (e.g., sovereign citizen groups and constitutional 
fundamentalists) claim believe the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided a broad 
definition of citizenship, created “an entirely new class of citizens”240 that people could 
voluntarily join.  As the members of these groups did not consent to the federal or state 
government, they resist—sometimes violently—nearly every form of governmental 
authority.  Sovereign citizens, for example, are often charged with driving without a 
license or registration, filing bogus liens, harassing their opponents using “rulings” by 
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fabricated judicial bodies, and resisting any authority above the level of county sheriff.241  
Although this use of non-violence is their preferred method of resisting the government, 
sovereign citizens also use intimidation tactics and occasionally resort to violence against 
federal officials.242  For instance, Terry Nichols—a member of the sovereign citizen 
movement—became notorious as Timothy McVeigh’s co-conspirator in the 1995 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.243  
Right-wing extremist groups also perceive the Liberal Left as a threat to their 
version of the traditional American way of life.  Thus, they oppose taxation that they 
perceive to be used to implement a liberal agenda.244  They have opposed state initiatives 
to distribute civil rights and liberties among “traditionally subordinate groups,”245 
including affirmative action legislation, anti-discrimination bills, and women’s rights.246  
Sex education in the public schools and “social workers who think they know better than 
parents” are also opposed.  One far right organization named “Angry White Males” 
appears to have emerged in response to perceived relative economic deprivation, the 
reaffirmation of traditional values and privileges, and cultural backlash.247  Right-wing 
groups that adhere to the anti-government ideology include the Posse Comitatus, Militia 
of Montana and other militia organizations, The Covenant, The Sword, and the Arm of 
the Lord and other survivalist groups, and the various Common Law courts. 
In addition to racism and a distrust of strong government, the third major strand of 
ideology found in right-wing extremism is an intolerant affirmation of the superiority of 
Christian (American) values to the extent that it is a form of fundamentalism.  Its strict 
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and narrow fundamentalist interpretations of morality places the Christian Right248 
squarely in this category of right-wing ideology and differentiates it from other Christian 
religions and organizations that adhere to a more pluralistic approach to morality.249  The 
more moderate, non-violent Christian Right is generally concerned with “morality 
policies”250 aimed at regulating the “moral conduct of all Americans.”251  Their efforts 
include a push for mandatory prayer in public schools and the censoring of libraries and 
the media for anti-Christian or anti-family values.252  Other major issues involve being 
against abortion, divorce, and homosexual rights.  Auxiliary issues concern gambling and 
home schooling.253  The moderate Christian Right prescribes the enforcement of 
Christian values and rituals by social institutions, viewing the federal government as the 
“enforcer of a religious moral code.”254  In contrast, violent anti-abortion activists are a 
notorious expression of the Christian Far Right.  These elements of the far right step 
outside the bounds of legitimate and acceptable behavior with their use of violence to 
achieve social change that reflect their absolutist perspective of morality.   
Known for their perceived moral superiority, the Christian fundamentalists are 
offended that they are perceived as “depraved minority underclass lifestyles” that 
produce “social evils” such as births to unwed mothers, street crime, and other “deviant” 
acts.255  Accordingly, government policies and programs directed at protecting, 
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extending, and enforcing rival “non-Christian” values have to be opposed.256  Christian 
fundamentalists opposed the Equal Rights Amendment, claiming it would make same-sex 
marriage legal and would make it impossible for the Supreme Court to reverse its 1973 
Roe v. Wade decision.257  Likewise, the Christian fundamentalists opposed the feminist 
movement, portraying it as “a socialist, anti-family political movement encouraging 
women to leave their husbands, kill their children, practice witchcraft, destroy capitalism, 
and become lesbians.”258  And when it comes to social welfare programs, Christian 
fundamentalists are “strongly suspicious of the true need of welfare recipients” and 
oppose any social program designed to help the “undeserving” poor.259  Christian 
fundamentalists view social misfortunes as the result of non-adherence to Christian 
values and will thus advocate evangelicalization over welfare programs.260  In a shocking 
display of Christian fundamentalism that illustrates this point, television evangelists Jerry 
Falwell and Pat Robertson suggested that liberal civil liberties groups, feminists, 
homosexuals, and abortion rights supporters were partially responsible for the 9/11 
terrorist attacks.  The actions of these groups, according to the two evangelists, “have 
turned God’s anger against America.”261  For Christian fundamentalists, bad things 
happen to people when they abandon Christian values. 
Christian fundamentalism can also be found in the relatively more secular notion 
of American exceptionalism.  American exceptionalism is the belief that “America’s 
canonical commitments to liberty, equality, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire 
exempt it from the historical forces that have led to the corruption of other societies.”  Its 
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roots are attributed to Alexis de Tocqueville, who claimed the United States stood apart 
from other countries because of its unique historical evolution, national credo, and 
distinctive political and religious institutions.262  Adherents to this notion hold a 
supernaturalist perception that God selected the United States for the rest of the world “to 
admire and emulate”263  and that the country was intended by God to play a unique and 
superior role in the world.264  During the Cold War, the role of the United States came in 
its task to protect the world from the evils of communism.  Communism, with its class 
struggle equivalent to the gospel’s “good news to the poor,” was perceived as a God-less 
religion265 and thus, a threat to the Christian faith.  Thus, it was an intolerant belief of the 
superiority of Christian values, supported by a Manichean view that pitted righteousness 
Christian Americans against communist atheists, that drove the Christian Right’s support 
for anticommunism.266   
On the extreme right, the form of nationalism displayed by hardcore American 
exceptionalists tends to mimic religious devotion with an intolerance of and contempt for 
dissent towards the extreme right’s concept of America.  This “superpatriotism,” a term 
coined by progressive political analyst Michael Parenti, demands that the country has not 
only the right, but also the “duty to do whatever it deems necessary”267 to protect itself 
and its interests.  Anything less would be un-American.  During the Cold War, this 
ideology manifested in those who believed in the superiority of democracy and the right 
to free speech while dutifully denying communists, atheists, and doubters of the 
American foreign policy the podium.268  More recently, President Barack Obama has 
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been criticized by the far right for displaying “a sense of humility”269 when he offered his 
opinion regarding American leadership in world politics.270 
C.  SUMMARY 
According to the theory of collective behavior, right-wing extremism cannot 
emerge and flourish in a society unless there is a generalized belief or ideology that 
identifies the source of existing social conflict, attributes certain characteristics to this 
source, and specifies certain responses to alleviate the social conflict.  In short, collective 
right-wing extremist action is not possible unless it is relevant and meaningful to 
potential actors.  This chapter explored the ideologies that motivate the American far 
right and justify its use of violence in pursuit of its social and political agenda.  It looked 
at the far right’s xenophobic tendencies, distrust it has towards the government, and the 
motivation it derives from Christian fundamentalism and American exceptionalism.  The 
following chapter uses these ideologies together with the other determinants of collective 
behavior to test the hypothesis that the conditions and dynamics present in contemporary 
United States may likely lead to a violent confrontation between right-wing extremist 
groups and government authorities.   
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IV. DOMESTIC RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN THE HEALTH 
CARE DEBATE 
In April 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warned against the 
possibility of right-wing extremist violence and suggested that the worsening domestic 
economic environment and the election of the first African-American president could 
lead to violent confrontations between right-wing extremists and law enforcement 
agencies.271  This chapter examines the relationship between the conditions and 
dynamics in today’s socio-economic and political climate and their influence on right-
wing extremism.  It sets the stage by providing a short history of health care reform 
efforts in the United States.  The debate on health care reform may be the precipitating 
event or part of a sequence of precipitating events from which right-wing extremism 
emerges.  The chapter then progresses by using the determinants of collective behavior to 
examine the conditions and dynamics present in today’s American society.  More 
specifically, under the context of the current health care reform efforts of the Obama 
administration, this chapter examines the structural conduciveness of the current social, 
economic, and political environment; the various social conflicts currently pressuring 
American society; and the effectiveness of the American far right to employ its right-
wing ideologies to broaden its public support, extend its political influence, and pursue its 
social, economic, and political agenda.  In short, this chapter discusses the social 
structures that are supportive of right-wing extremism.  Two determinants of collective 
behavior are not examined in this chapter.  The mobilization infrastructure of the 
domestic far right and the operation of existing social controls in the United States are 
currently not supportive of a surge in domestic right-wing extremism and will be 
addressed in Chapter V. 
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A. HEALTH CARE REFORM AS A PRECIPITATING EVENT 
In 1945, President Harry Truman made the first sustained effort to pass a national 
health insurance plan in order to protect 15 million uninsured Americans.272  His 10-year 
plan proposed compulsory coverage, increased hospital construction, and doubled the 
number of doctors and nurses nationwide.  However, after the American Medical 
Association and other critics capitalized on the public fear of Communism and warned of 
the dangers of “socialized medicine,”273 the initiative was defeated in Congress.  Focus 
returned to health care reform in the 1960s; and on July 30, 1965, President Lyndon B. 
Johnson created the Medicare and Medicaid programs, providing comprehensive health 
care coverage for the elderly, the poor, and the physically-challenged.274  Inefficiencies 
and misplaced incentives soon caused health care costs to increase faster than the general 
cost of living and politicians have since struggled to compromise on proposals that would 
control costs and keep the number of uninsured Americans in check.  In 1994, President 
William Clinton failed to pass a comprehensive national health care reform package that 
guaranteed universal health insurance, despite it being a priority of his administration.275  
And although in 2003, President George W. Bush successfully expanded Medicare to 
give prescription drug coverage to the elderly,276  this expansion rapidly accelerated 
Medicare spending to its fastest growth rate since 1981.  By 2006, health care costs 
exceeded $2.2 trillion, or 16.2 percent of the economy.277  According to the Government 
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Accountability Office, by 2010, the growth in health care spending will render “public 
[health care] program obligations… unsustainable for future generations of 
Americans.”278   
Currently, health care reform dominates President Obama’s domestic agenda.279  
The current administration seeks to cover approximately 40 million Americans who are 
currently uninsured by reducing the cost of health care and making the health care system 
more efficient.280  Most Americans support many of the essential elements of legislation 
being considered, although almost five in ten Americans currently oppose the health care 
reform proposal currently in Congress.281   
B. STRUCTURAL CONDUCIVENESS TOWARDS RIGHT-WING 
EXTREMISM 
There are a number of necessary conditions that need to be present for any kind of 
collective behavior to emerge.  One determinant refers to the permissiveness of a 
particular environment towards a particular type of collective behavior.  Structural 
conduciveness can be thought of in terms of societal values and norms, social 
organization or structures (e.g., families, churches, government agencies, associations, 
political parties), and opportunities for and limitations to action as presented by the 
environment.  As political commentator Thomas Powers notes, “the United States offers 
an alternative to the hardships of life underground in political war against the system: 
polls, press agents and political-action committees get results where bombs only get 
attention.”282  Legitimate instruments for expressing dissent and effecting change exist 
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and are available to Americans.  However, if these legitimate instruments succumb to 
pressures, they may eventually fail—as their German equivalents did after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1990—leaving the American society vulnerable to the appeal of right-
wing ideologies.   
This section focuses on three embodiments of societal permissiveness towards 
right-wing extremism: (1) the American two-party political system and its relation with 
the socio-economic fragmentation in American society; (2) the radicalizing nature of 
conservative media and the failure of the American political elite to denounce extremist 
rhetoric; and (3) the pressures being exerted to suppress, intentionally or unintentionally, 
political and social forums that are traditionally employed to discuss and address 
legitimate grievances.   
Although the American bipartisan political system has been flexible enough to 
accommodate the demands of a multicultural society, it can also be polarizing.  From a 
social aspect, the Republican Party has traditionally been seen as the “white people’s 
party.”283  Although the party’s demographic composition284 may partially explain this 
perception, the moniker can also be explained by the Republican Party’s notorious 
political strategy of exploiting racial conflict.  Initially, this strategy was employed to 
attract Southern whites to the party after the Democratic Party embraced the Civil Rights 
movement.285  However, journalists and political analysts still observe Republicans 
conducting political campaigns that focused on racially-dividing issues (e.g., street crime, 
poverty, welfare benefits) to exploit public anxieties regarding “the menace of underclass 
minority populations”286 to broaden their support base.  In 1968, Richard Nixon stressed 
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race and its connection with crime to gain electoral votes.287  Former president Ronald 
Reagan allegedly polarized the American public with race-driven issues, using ostensibly 
race-neutral political language to avoid the stigma of racism.288  After losing control of 
the executive and legislative branches of government, the Republican Party may likely 
continue with this strategy and attempt to transform the “mass hostility against what the 
public sees as the predatory acts of the minority underclass”289 into political clout.  This 
feature of the bipartisan political system may fuel racial tensions in the health care reform 
debate as Republicans and Democrats line up on opposite sides of the issue.290 
From an economic class perspective, most Americans agree that the Republican 
Party favors the rich and Democrats favor the middle and lower class.291   Indeed, the 
Republican Party is viewed as a coalition of business and upper-income voters that favors 
lower taxes, less government spending, and minimal economic regulation.  In 
comparison, the Democratic Party is viewed as the party of labor, favoring economic 
redistribution via higher taxes, social welfare spending, and government regulation.292  
This divide is particularly significant if one considers the possibility, or at least the 
perception, of class conflict in the health care debate.  The two-party political system may 
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thus render health care reform vulnerable to class issues, potentially turning it from an 
issue of “fundamentally moral importance”293 into a proxy conflict between capitalism 
and socialism.   
Augmenting the structural conduciveness provided by the American bipartisan 
political system is the polarizing nature of conservative media and political personalities. 
Immediately after the Obama administration assumed power, influential conservative 
media celebrities and politicians targeted the Democratic-led government’s efforts to 
address various socio-economic challenges confronting the United States.  Although 
those opposing the government should be given adequate avenues to air their grievances, 
instead of engaging in substantive policy analysis and critique, a number of these 
conservative personalities have fueled conspiracy theories and have employed rhetoric 
reminiscent of the far-right campaign of militia movement leaders in the early 1990s.  
Central to their opposition are the claims that “the evil liberal president literally intends to 
destroy our country”294  and that the far right has the duty to stop him.295 
According to political journalist and author David Neiwert, the current far right 
rhetoric advocates what he calls “eliminationism,”  defined as “a politics and a culture 
that shuns dialogue and the democratic exchange of ideas in favor of the pursuit of 
outright elimination of the opposing side, either through suppression, exile, ejection, or 
extermination.”  It favors the dehumanization and vilification of opponents and suggests 
their excision at the expense of an honest and productive dialogue.296  In the current 
political climate, examples of this eliminationistic rhetoric include:  
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 Four days before President Barack Obama’s inauguration, conservative 
talk show host Rush Limbaugh claimed he hoped what he considered the 
president’s socialist policies to fail.297 
 In his April 2, 2009 article, Quin Hillyer of the American Spectator 
compared the Obama administration’s policies to that of fascist Italy, 
suggested President Obama was the American version of Italy’s fascist 
dictator Benito Mussolini, and thus justified—in an interesting leap of 
logic—opposing any government-sponsored program.298 
 From early to mid-April 2009, the Fox News Channel heavily promoted299 
anti-government “tea party” events at which speakers “joked” about a 
coup against “the communist Muslim Barack Obama.”300  On September 
29, 2009, a blogger at conservative media outlet Newsmax suggested that 
a military coup is necessary to resolve the “Obama problem.”301 
 South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford refused a $700 million stimulus 
for his state, declaring “you can’t wear the [Republican] jersey and play 
for the other team!”302 His declaration connotes an opposition to any 
government action that is not initiated by his political party, regardless of 
the potential benefits to his constituency. 
 Ahead of President Obama’s back-to-school speech to school children on 
September 8, 2009, Florida Republican Chairman Jim Greer accused the 
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President of using taxpayer money to “indoctrinate” children and push the 
President’s “socialist ideology” on impressionable young minds.303 
 On September 28, 2009, a presenter at the “How To Take Back America” 
conference, which was attended by former Arkansas Republican Governor 
Mike Huckabee and Minnesota Republican Congresswoman Michele 
Bachmann, drew parallels between President Obama and the rise of 
Adolph Hitler.304  In the same conference, Republican Congressman Trent 
Franks of Arizona stated that President Obama is an “enemy of 
humanity.”305   
Amplifying the eliminationist tone of conservative spokespersons is the failure of 
other political elites to unequivocally denounce this type of rhetoric.  When Republican 
elites have denounced inflammatory conservative spokespersons, they quickly found 
themselves backpedaling.  When Republican Party Chairman Michael Steele called Rush 
Limbaugh’s rhetoric “incendiary” and “ugly,” he hastily professed his “enormous 
respect” for the talk show host.306  When Republican House representative Phil Gingrey 
of Georgia attempted to distance his party from the antics of conservative pundits Rush 
Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, and Newt Gingrich,307 he quickly apologized to the 
“conservative giants” for what he referred to as his “stupid comments.”308  The absence 
of an outright rejection of this eliminationistic rhetoric may be interpreted as tacit 
approval to those who would operationalize it. 
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Both parties in the American political system and their supporters have 
traditionally demonized their political adversaries.  Eliminationism arguably takes it a 
step further by creating cultural and psychological conditions that promote a permissive 
environment that enables subsequent right-wing political violence.309  By not denouncing 
eliminationist rhetoric under the guise of free speech, American media personalities and 
politicians send a message to their audience that such talk, its accompanying hateful 
worldview, and its eventual associated political violence are acceptable.  As noted in the 
German case study in Chapter II, the media provides an ideal stage to discount the stigma 
of and taboo against extreme right-wing ideologies.  If it is characterized by unbalanced 
reporting and sensationalism, the media can shape public perceptions by attributing some 
degree of legitimacy to extremist ideologies and their associated violence.  Similarly, as 
concluded after the analysis of both the American and German case studies in Chapter II, 
the failure of political elites to denounce extremist rhetoric advocating violence, as well 
as extremist violence itself, provides a relatively risk-free environment for right-wing 
violent activists. 
The combination of the polarizing nature of the American political system and of 
influential conservative personalities produces substantial pressure on legitimate practices 
of democracy.  Public debate and civil discourse has been a cornerstone of the American 
political system, but in the summer of 2009, highly vocal pundits attempted to suppress 
legitimate forms of democratic practices by thwarting attempts by moderates to correct 
what Associated Press contributor Charles Babington calls “confusing claims and 
outright distortions”310 and to engage in honest debate on health care reform.  On one 
side of the political aisle, Republican political elites and supporters claimed Obama’s 
health care plan would create “death panels” that would ration care for “the sick, the 
elderly, and the disabled,”311 a claim adamantly denied by President Obama during his 
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speech to a joint session of Congress.312  On the other side, Democrats characterized the 
Republican health care plan as one that calls for sick people to “die quickly,” which 
falsely portrayed Republicans as having no alternative health care reform proposal.313  
The inability of the political elites to moderate an honest debate in Congress may cause 
the American public to question its ability to affect comprehensive and much-needed 
social change.   
Outside of Congress, Americans have witnessed health care reform protestors 
who have disrupted and halted any meaningful discussion at public forums and town hall 
meetings.  At a town hall meeting in Tampa, Florida, protestors resorted to “banging on 
doors and windows” until police and organizers were forced to end the event.314  In 
Lebanon, Pennsylvania, Democrat senator Arlen Specter was repeatedly booed and 
heckled as many of the attendees expressed “broad if unspecified disdain” for the 
government and for President Obama.315  Consequently, these forums have become “rude 
and disrespectful”316 and have devolved into a shouting match where “vocal extremists” 
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town halls, “a violent mob silenced the voices of every American” and “trampled 
underfoot…the most basic act of our democracy: civic conversation with an eye towards 
problem solving.”318 
Verbal and physical altercations are not the only tactics employed to disrupt 
public discussions concerning health care reform.  Protestors have also used intimidation 
tactics, threatening the First Amendment right by the Second Amendment, as political 
journalist David Sirota alleges.319  On August 8, 2009, a concealed gun fell out of its 
owner’s holster at a “Congress on Your Corner” event in Sierra Vista, Arizona, 
presumably to threaten Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords with violence for her stance 
on health care reform.320  In Portsmouth, New Hampshire, William Kostric took 
advantage of state law permitting the open carry of firearms and stood outside a town hall 
meeting on health care held by President Obama with a loaded firearm strapped to his leg 
and a sign saying, “It is Time to Water the Tree of Liberty”—a reference to Thomas 
Jefferson’s quote that “the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the 
blood of patriots and tyrants”321  and to domestic terrorist Timothy McVeigh who wore a 
t-shirt bearing the Jefferson quote on the day he bombed the Murrah Building in 
Oklahoma City.322   
As the case studies in Chapter II illustrated, the lack of honest debate and 
intelligent discussion in appropriate forums and the eventual perception that social 
change is not possible through legitimate political means may precede a rise in right-wing 
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violence.  Unless the legitimate leadership of the political parties can regain control of the 
health care debate and reassure to the American public that “good government happens 
when opposing views can confront each other in the political process”323 and unless the  
political establishment successfully counters the far right’s strategy of intimidation and 
violence, the health care reform and the American public may remain hostage to the 
potentially-violent fringe. 
C. STRUCTURAL STRAIN IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
Sociologists, terrorism experts, and criminologists almost universally agree that 
groups and individuals respond collectively to “something [that is] wrong in their social 
environment.”324  Although structural conduciveness in itself may positively influence 
right-wing extremism, structural strains that align with the conditions of conduciveness 
must also be present.  Structural strain in contemporary American society primarily takes 
the form of a culture of distrust towards the government, a social conflict between 
immigrants and native-born Americans, and a class struggle between the rich and the 
poor. 
Examining polls conducted in 1964–1965, the Pew Research Center concludes 
that the present broad opposition to health care reform can be significantly attributed to a 
broad distrust of government, a distrust that was not evident in the 1960s when the social-
welfare program Medicare was being debated.  In 1958, 65 percent of Americans 
reported “they trusted the [federal] government… to do the right thing just about always 
or most of the time.”325  Since then, subsequent polls have never seen such trust in the 
federal government by a majority of Americans.326  In May 2009, while most Americans 
believe that the government is run “for the benefit of all people” and that it is the 
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government’s responsibility to “take care of people who cannot take care of themselves,” 
many worried about excessive government involvement in health care.327   
Structural strain is also manifested in the perceived “strong conflicts”328 between 
immigrants and people born in the United States.  According to the statistics provided by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, there is a general upward trend in reported hate 
crimes against Hispanics and other ethnic groups since 1995.329  In 2007, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation reported about 62 percent of ethnically-motivated hate crime 
offenses were committed against Hispanics (775 out of 1,256 ethnically-motivated 
offenses incidents), with over half (405 incidents) committed by whites and with 20 
percent committed by blacks.330  CivilRights.Org, a coalition of civil rights 
organizations, argues that a recent marked increase in hate violence against Hispanics 
“correlates closely with the increasingly heated debate” over comprehensive immigration 
reform and an escalation in anti-immigrant rhetoric on radio, on television, and on the 
Internet.  The group claims that xenophobic animosity towards immigrants, combined 
with the country’s current economic downturn and the election of the country’s first 
African-American president, is responsible for a surge in the activity of racist groups.331 
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The health care debate has refocused animosity towards immigrants through concerns 
that undocumented workers may be able to access health care benefits at taxpayers’ 
expense.   
Another source of strain is perceived in conflicts between blacks and whites.  
Thirty-nine percent of Americans believe there is a serious conflict between the two 
races, with 53 percent of blacks being more likely to see “very strong” or “strong” 
conflicts.332  Unlike the upward trend in hate crimes against immigrants, hate crimes 
against blacks and against whites have been trending downward after a spike in 1996.  
However, in 2007, hate crimes against blacks accounted for more than a third of all hate 
crimes, with 91 percent of the cases where the race of the assailant was known were 
perpetuated by whites.  Similarly, 65 percent of racially-based hate crimes against whites 
were committed by blacks.333 
A fourth source of strain is the perceived class struggle between rich and poor 
people. Forty-seven percent of Americans perceive a “very strong/strong” conflict 
between the rich and the poor.334  This is in contrast to analysis conducted in 2005 that 
concluded that despite the reality of widening inequalities in income and wealth, many 
still believed in the American Dream—“though you may start poor, if you work hard, you 
can make pots of money”335—and blamed “poor foreigners,” not their rich fellow 
Americans, for their economic woes.336  The shift in perception is probably due to the 
current economic crisis, which is hitting poor America particularly hard with 
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unemployment creeping towards ten percent in September 2009.337  The highest rates of 
unemployment were concentrated in working class occupations (e.g., production; 
transportation; construction and extraction; and farming, fishing, and forestry) at a rate of 
15.5 percent.  In contrast, management, professional, and related occupations only 
experienced an unemployment rate of 9.5 percent.338  Furthermore, the recent housing 
bubble pushed national homeownership rate down to levels last seen in 2000339 and the 
continuing decline in home prices may have wiped out any equity some Americans might 
have had in their homes.340  As the economic downturn threatens their economic status, 
Americans may tend to identify themselves with the “poor” and become more sensitive to 
efforts by the political elite to protect the interests of their wealthy constituents and lobby 
groups. 
The social conflicts perceived in American society, combined with the societal 
conduciveness towards right-wing extremism, present opportunities that the far right can 
exploit by focusing their pursuit of their political agenda along these social faults.  
Correspondingly, the far right can build its support base by targeting the government, its 
“socialist” policies, and undocumented immigrants and other minority groups in the 
health care reform debate.   
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D. RIGHT-WING IDEOLOGY IN THE HEALTH CARE DEBATE 
Opposition against social welfare programs is not new in American politics.  
Granting social security benefits, legitimating labor unions, and legislating civil rights 
and other social programs have always elicited “great cries about looming socialism.”341  
The current health care reform debate is no different.  However, collective right-wing 
extremist behavior can only emerge if an appropriate belief system motivates the far right 
to take action.342   This ideology must identify persons or entities considered “responsible 
for the evils at hand”343 and provide concrete actions that excise them.  The American far 
right’s ideological mistrust of government, its historical crusade against Communism, 
and its xenophobic and racist tendencies align with the previously-discussed conflicts 
present in the contemporary United States.  These belief systems significantly influence 
the far right’s opposition against the Obama administration and their attacks against 
immigrants and the poor.344 
On one front, the far right attempts to invoke the same fears that turned 
anticommunism into an American religion345 during the Cold War.  During the 2008 
presidential campaign, opponents of Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama 
attempted to portray him as dangerously anti-American.  In 2008, Iowa Republican 
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Representative Steve King concluded that President Obama was “even more extreme 
than a socialist” and would turn the United States into a totalitarian dictatorship.346  On 
multiple occasions during the 2008 presidential campaign, then-Republican vice 
presidential nominee Sarah Palin implied that Obama was a socialist.347  These attacks 
have continued after President Obama assumed office and while he advocates for 
comprehensive health care reform.  In this regard, the basic elements of opposition to 
health care reform by the far right closely parallels those that drove its anticommunism 
campaign during the Cold War.  At that time, the far right believed there was a 
conspiracy to undermine free capitalism, to bring the economy under the direction of the 
federal government, and to pave the way for socialism or communism.  Moreover, it 
claimed that upper echelon of government was infiltrated by communists who were 
“selling out” American national interests.348  Indeed, the effort by conservatives to get 
parents to pull their children out of school on the day President Obama was scheduled to 
give a speech to schoolchildren349 was reminiscent of 1935 when drugstore magnate 
Charles R. Walgreen pulled his niece from the University of Chicago “to save her from 
Communist indoctrination.”350    
Consistent with its past opposition to Communism, the far right views support for 
any policy deemed to be “socialist”—regardless of its social benefits—as “un-
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American.”351  For the far right, it is one’s patriotic duty to oppose any policy advocated 
by the “Radical Leftist Obama.”352  Although there are legitimate concerns held by 
health care reform opponents (e.g., those who have health care insurance are worried that 
universal coverage will adversely affect the quality of their own care353), the far right 
advocates opposition to health care reform because it is simply “socialist.”   
Also consistent with anticommunist tendencies is a perception that health care 
reform is a form of class conflict.  Because the current proposal entitles all Americans—
regardless of their employment status and their ability to pay354—to a comprehensive 
package of benefits, it may invoke fears that the upper and middle classes would be 
required to substantially subsidize coverage for the lower class through additional 
taxes355 or through cost-passing.356  While this is a natural reaction and is not necessarily 
confined to right-wing extremists, it does appeal to the anti-socialist sectors of the far 
right.  In addition, not only does opposition to universal health insurance appeal to those 
who oppose any form of government-directed wealth distribution, it also appeals to those 
who possess degrading views of those living in poverty.  Unlike mainstream 
conservatives who believe those who are poor possess the capability of improving their 
                                                 
351 House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer commited a political faux 
pas when they penned an opinion column that called health care reform opponents “un-American.” 
Although she was referring to the “ugly campaign” to disrupt public meetings and prevent members of 
Congress from “conducting a civil dialogue,” the far right used the opinion article to justify their opposition 
against an administration that itself was un-American for suppressing “patriotic dissent.”  Nancy Pelosi and 
Steny Hoyer, “’Un-American’ Attacks Can’t Derail Health Care Debates,” USA Today, August 10, 2009, 
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2009/08/unamerican-attacks-cant-derail-health-care-debate-.html (accessed 
October 9, 2009). 
352 Looking at the Left, “Dissent Against Radical Leftist Obama is Patriotic,” November 2008, 
http://www.lookingattheleft.com/2008/11/dissent-against-obama-is-patriotic/ (accessed October 9, 2009). 
353 Kevin Sack and Majorie Connelly, “In Poll, Wide Support for Government-Run Health,” New 
York Times, June 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/health/policy/21poll.html (accessed 
October 8, 2009); Ceci Connolly and Jon Cohen, “Most Want Health Reform But Fear Its Side Effects,” 
Washington Post, June 24, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/23/ 
AR2009062303510.html (accessed October 8, 2009). 
354 White House, “The Obama Plan: Stability and Security for All Americans,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/health_care/plan/ (accessed October 8, 2009). 
355 Ryan J. Donmoyer and Kristen Jensen, “House Plans to Tax Millionaires to Fund Health Care,” 
Bloomberg, July 15, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087 
&sid=aUVZeh_GVBYM (accessed October 8, 2009). 
356 Associated Press, “Tax Health Care to Pay for Health Care?” Fox News, May 13, 2009, 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/elections/2009/05/13/tax-health-care-pay-health-care/ (accessed October 
8, 2009). 
 77
status if given the necessary tools, segments of the far right associate poverty with race 
and racial inequality or with non-adherence to religious (i.e., Christian) norms and  
values.  As such, poverty is a result of one’s genetically-induced lack of work ethic357 or 
is a manifestation of God’s punishment for a transgression.358 
On another front, right-wing extremist opposition to heath care reform has been 
motivated by a racist ideology that provokes animosity towards the African-American 
president.  As former President Jimmy Carter points out, the antagonism displayed by 
opponents of and protestors against health care reform “[are] not casual outcomes of a 
sincere debate over [health care reform]… [It] is based on the fact that [President Obama] 
is a black man.”359  The American right has consistently denied charges that it is 
injecting racism into the health care debate.360  Nevertheless, the portrayal of President 
Obama as a witch doctor361 and as a dead primate,362 the claim that health care reform is 
a tool to provide reparations to the African-American community,363 and incidents of 
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race-tinged crimes364 suggests that the health care debate is being used to exploit latent 
racial sentiments to elicit the support of the racist right, defeat health care reform, and 
expand the far right’s political influence at the expense of the American public. 
Opposition against health care reform is also based on degrading perceptions 
regarding immigrants and the poor.  Republican Representative Joe Wilson of South 
Carolina’s shout of “You lie!” during President Obama’s health care address to 
Congress365 drew focus to the undocumented immigrant issue in health care reform.  
Undocumented immigrants and their children account for 17 percent of the one-in-six 
Americans who are uninsured;366 and in the past, Medicare has been criticized for using 
taxpayer dollars to subsidize their emergency room treatments.367  While Americans are 
not concerned with immigrants who are here through legal immigration, they are 
understandably concerned that taxpayers will be forced to finance an even more 
comprehensive health care package for undocumented immigrants.  Opposition to 
subsidizing health care for undocumented immigrants and their children is not necessarily 
racist.  However, it does appeal to and mobilize the racist elements of right368 who view 
racial minorities as “illegitimate trespassers”369 who threaten to reduce the rights and 
privileges they currently enjoy.   
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However, while there are legitimate concerns that fuel opposition to health care 
reform, right-wing ideologies offer a worldview that appeals and mobilizes the opposition 
of the far right.  Though racists, anticommunists, anti-immigrants, and religious 
fundamentalists “tend to be on the fringes of the right”370 and do not comprise the 
majority of health care opponents, their history of violent activities to advance their social 
agenda is cause for concern.   
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter explores the possible relationship between today’s socio-economic 
and political climate and right-wing extremism, using the framework provided by the 
theory of collective behavior.  Using the context of the current health care reform efforts 
as a possible precipitating event around which the domestic far right may mobilize, this 
chapter explores the social structures present in today’s socio-economic and political 
environment that exert a positive influence on right-wing extremism.  In particular, this 
chapter examines the polarizing potential of the American political system, the 
prevalence of eliminationistic rhetoric by conservative spokespersons, and the pressures 
on legitimate forms of democracy.  It identifies the various social conflicts present in 
American society and explores the efforts of domestic right-wing extremists to align 
these conflicts with right-wing ideologies.  This partial application of the theory of 
collective behavior gives the impression that the current social, economic, and political 
environment in contemporary United States is conducive to violent domestic right-wing 
extremist activity.   
Chapter V continues the application of the theory of collective behavior and 
examines the mobilization infrastructure of the domestic far right and the operation of 
existing social controls in the United States.    
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V. ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM 
IN CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES 
In its warning against a potential rise in right-wing extremist activities, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) pointed to similarities between current 
sociopolitical circumstances and those of the early 1990s and concluded that these 
similarities were likely to lead to violent confrontations between right-wing extremist 
groups and government authorities.371  Chapter IV examined these factors in a partial 
application of the theory of collective behavior.  Despite the similarities between the 
United States in the early 1990s and today’s society, the domestic far right has avoided 
violent actions—notwithstanding verbal attacks and intimidation tactics—in expressing 
its discontent and in attempting to achieve change in pursuit of its social agenda  In light 
of the global recession and the current American financial crisis, Anti-Semitists appear 
contented to simply blame former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and his 
successor, Ben Bernanke, both of whom are Jewish.372  In addition, while they were 
quick to point out that Bernard Madoff, the “extraordinary evil”373 mastermind of a $50 
billion Ponzi scheme,374 was also Jewish,375 they appear unenthused to take further 
action.  Furthermore, while instances of white persons being physically abused by 
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minorities376 prompted conservative talk show host Rush Limbaugh to attempt to connect 
President Obama with the rise of hate crimes against white Americans,377 rage on the 
right appeared to quickly dissipate.  In these instances, the responses of the far right to 
emerging events appeared to be less severe and less coordinated than what DHS 
predicted. 
The domestic far right’s avoidance of violent action highlights the Department of 
Homeland Security’s failure to consider factors in American society that deter a surge in 
activity by the domestic far right.  This chapter examines the remaining determinants of 
collective behavior—the mobilization infrastructure of the domestic far right and the 
operation of existing social controls in the United States—and the hypothesis that the 
social, economic, and political conditions and dynamics in contemporary United States 
may lead to a violent confrontation between domestic right-wing extremists and 
government agencies.  It also considers the homeland security implications of this 
evaluation. 
A. MOBILIZATION INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE DOMESTIC FAR RIGHT 
Collective behavior theory assumes that there is a group of individuals who 
perceive themselves to be marginalized and who mobilize after concluding that potential 
benefits of participation in collective behavior outweigh anticipated costs.378  In the case 
of the domestic far right, the “attacks they suffer” are meaningless unless they are able to 
mobilize and defeat President Obama and his “hidden agenda.”379  The theory also posits 
that successful mobilization is dependent on the movement’s ability to manage these 
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groups and individuals.  Hence, leadership, organization, and resources are taken into 
consideration.  In the health care reform debate, the far right’s failure to effectively 
mobilize may be due to the lack of a supportive infrastructure.  Although Chapter IV 
notes that conservative media personalities and politicians have given voice to extremist 
views, there has been the absence of a unifying political actor—an individual or group—
with enough influence to consolidate and direct the far right.  Hence, the mobilization of 
the domestic far right is hampered by its lack of leadership. 
The American right has been in a leadership vacuum380 since the Republican 
Party fell out of favor when views of President George W. Bush and the war in Iraq 
turned negative.381  Since then, the political party has found itself in “warlord status,”382 
with various factions within the Republican Party turning to different leaders who are 
pulling the party in different directions.  Consequently, the power struggle turns every 
faction against one another: 
 After announcing his plans for a public relations offensive to attract 
younger voters, especially blacks and Hispanics, Republican National 
Committee Chairman Michael S. Steel was told by elected congressional 
Republicans to refrain from “attempting to establish party policy.”383   
 In April 2009, House Republican whip Eric Cantor from Virginia, with the 
blessing of both the House and Senate Republican leadership,384 launched 
the National Council for a New America to “have a dialogue with the 
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American people.”385  Social conservatives criticized this effort for not 
being “conservative enough,”386 as it did not address abortion, 
immigration, and same-sex marriage.387  On his talk show, Rush 
Limbaugh called the council a “scam” that pandered to Americans to get 
their votes.388   
 Former secretary of state Colin Powell and former House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich blame the decline of the Republican Party on conservative 
extremists because they were alienating moderate conservatives as well as 
undecided and independent voters.389  In contrast, conservatives like 
former vice president Dick Cheney blame the moderates, declaring it 
would be a “mistake” for the Republican Party to be moderate.390  For 
these conservatives – who include former Republican vice presidential 
candidate Sarah Palin, Minnesota governor Tim Pawlenty, former House 
Majority Leader Dick Armey, and former Republican presidential 
candidate Steve Forbes – the only way for the party to return to power is 
to cater more to the biases of its conservative base.391 
These clashes have kept the far right from throwing its support behind the 
Republican Party and have weakened the party’s electoral support.  In 2001, 32 percent 
of Americans identified themselves as Republican.392  By October 2009, Republican 
identification fell to 20 percent, the lowest percentage since 1983.393  Despite 40 percent 
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of all Americans describing themselves as “conservatives,”394 polls revealed that 54 
percent of American viewed the Republican Party negatively395  and only 19 percent 
expressed confidence in the Republicans in Congress “to make the right decisions for the 
country’s future.”396  In addition to mainstream Americans, the far right has expressed 
disappointment towards Republican Party as well, viewing it as “ineffective and 
rudderless” and led by “political professionals” who are disconnected with the 
conservative base and its values.397  Although they have no intention of changing their 
party affiliation, they have little confidence in the Republican Party’s current direction or 
leadership.398 
The political leadership struggle within the Republican Party has implications for 
the mobilization of the domestic far right.  As noted in the case studies, complicity of the 
part of the political elite with regards to political violence encourages extremists to 
pursue their social goals outside legitimate political processes.  Conversely, public 
condemnation of extremist violence by political leaders restrains violent extremist 
activities. In the current health care reform debate, on one front, moderate Republican 
elites—among them former Senators Bob Dole399 and Bill Frist, California governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger, and New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg400—have been 
working with Democrats to pass major healthcare reform.  They have also denounced 
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Republican obstructionists401 as being “irresponsible”402 for opposing healthcare reform 
for short-term political motives.  On an opposing front, more conservative Republican 
elites have been catering to the biases of the more extreme conservative base and have 
called for an “orderly revolution”403 against the Obama administration.  Mixed signals 
from Republican politicians may be causing it right-wing extremist supporters to hesitate.   
B. OPERATION OF SOCIAL CONTROLS AGAINST RIGHT-WING 
EXTREMISM 
Social controls seek to minimize the contributing factors to structural 
permissiveness and social conflict in order to decrease the possibility of collective action 
or to restrain the escalation of collective action after its outbreak.  According to how the 
various agencies of social control (e.g., the police, the courts, the press, the community 
leaders, and even the people themselves) behave in the face of a potential outbreak of 
extremist violence, they can deter or advance its development.  In the Chapter II German 
case study, it was noted that the flexibility of its political system to accommodate the 
wide range of political views, as well as the social taboo against an outward 
demonstration of discontent and hostility towards foreigners, successfully marginalized 
the German far right until Germany society became more permissive with regards to anti-
foreigner violence.  The United States after Roe v Wade was the reverse—the complicity 
of society towards violence against abortion clinic personnel and facilities, as well as the 
distortion of religious and civil norms to legitimize anti-abortion violence, encouraged 
the right-wing activities.  It was only after the government implemented the appropriate 
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social controls that the activists were deterred.  Therefore, although major social 
structures in the United States may create a social disposition permissive with respect to 
right-wing extremist violence, society itself can deter its emergence.   
This section examines the operation of social controls within the context of the 
health care debate and how they decrease the possibility of an outbreak of collective 
right-wing violence.  More specifically, it explores the operation of social controls in the 
American bipartisan political system, the health care town halls, and in the existing social 
conflicts in American society.   
Chapter IV established that the American bipartisan political system has the 
potential to polarize the American society and be conducive to the emergence of right-
wing extremism.  Demographically and economically, the bipartisan political system may 
promote a binary worldview that prevents compromise for the greater good.  If the two 
parties are allowed to grow further apart from each other on matters relating to race, 
cultural concerns, and economic equality—for example, with the Democratic Party 
becoming more liberal and the Republican Party becoming more conservative—the 
political environment may become less centrist and either the far left or the far right or 
both may feel the need to exert themselves.404  This is similar to the structural 
conduciveness manifested in Italy in the 1960s and in Germany in the 1980s when their 
governments lost their centrist appeal and weakened.  In Italy, both the right and left 
responded by seeking to establish their political influence.  In Germany, the right sought 
to assert itself. 
In the current health care debate, influential conservative media personalities and 
politicians have been generating opposition to heath care reform by exploiting latent 
hostilities between races, engendering xenophobic animosity against immigrants, and 
imposing absolutist interpretations of religious, as well as civic, norms and values.  They 
also attempted to frame the debate as a struggle between democracy and socialism.  
Attempts of the moderate political elite to denounce eliminationistic rhetoric have met 
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limited access, but have also avoided a blocked political system similar to that discussed 
in the Chapter II case study of Italy.  While the Democratic-majority legislature advances 
the health care reform bill, influential conservatives are still pulling the Republican Party 
further to the right end of the political spectrum. 
Nonetheless, some Republican elites have already begun to move away from the 
more conservative elements of their party.  In an opinion editorial in the New York 
Times, moderate Republican Olympia Snowe singled out right-wing extremists as the 
reason for the decline of the Republican Party.  Snowe pointed out that when the 
Republican Party began emphasizing social issues (e.g., abortion rights, undocumented 
immigration, welfare) that it encountered “an electoral backlash.”405  Echoing the words 
of President Ronald Reagan, Snowe emphasized that the conservative party must return 
to what fundamentally constitutes a Republican (e.g., restrained government spending, 
pro-growth policies, tax reductions, sound national defense, individual liberty) and 
tolerate disagreement on issues “that draw on the deep springs of morality and 
emotion.”406  When Republican Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter found himself 
“increasingly at odds with the Republican philosophy”407 due to the Republican Party’s 
shift further to the right of the political spectrum, he switched affiliation and joined the 
Democratic Party.  More recently, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham and Republican 
insider David Frum publicly denounced the antics of conservative talk show hosts Rush 
Limbaugh and Glen Beck as counterproductive to the conservative movement and as 
exploiting a “market of cynicism.”408  
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It is unclear if the more moderate Republicans can draw the rest of their party 
towards the political center.  For now, while the struggle for the Republican Party 
leadership ensues and with moderate Republicans moving towards the center, the 
potential of the American bipartisan political system supporting the emergence of right-
wing extremism has been minimized.  If the Republican Party loses more political 
influence—especially after the congressional elections in 2010—the political right may 
have to jettison their more extreme rhetoric, risk alienating those demanding ideological 
purity,409 and move closer to the center to appeal to like-minded Democrats and 
independent voters. 
The United States has also seen vocal extremists suppressing honest and 
intelligent exchange of ideas in various political and social forums.  On the one hand, 
forums such as town hall meetings are designed to enable constituents to provide their 
congressional representative input regarding public policy issues.  On the other hand, 
these forums allow members of Congress to gain support for their policy decisions.  In 
the health care debate, these town halls, to a certain extent, were used by right-wing 
extremists to espouse their ideologies, to intimidate their opponents, and to create 
confusion as to the nature and intent of health care reform.   
Though in-person health care town hall meetings were frequently hijacked by 
vocal extremists and though vocal conservative pundits and politicians have flooded the 
media with their eliminationistic attacks, moderate congressional representatives and 
elected officials have had other avenues to connect with their constituents and address 
their legitimate concerns.  Internet town halls and social networking sites provided a 
critical link between elected officials and their constituents.  A study sponsored by the 
National Science Foundation and Harvard’s Ash Institute for Democratic Governance 
and Innovation concluded that Internet events hosted by elected officials, in general, 
avoided “posturing without content, collisions of opposing views, [and] strident 
domination of a single perspective.”  Moreover, they encouraged and produced 
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“thoughtful, respectful, fact-filled” and high-quality deliberation.410  Not only did 
President Obama turn to Internet events to engage Americans directly and advocate for 
health care reform, the White House Office of Health Reform and the Department of 
Health and Human Services hosted events to address health care concerns.411  Hence, 
political elites were still able to engage the American public and overcome efforts of 
extremists to suppress open and honest debate.  In turn, the pressures exerted on the 
processes that ensure “good government happens when opposing views can confront each 
other in the political process”412 have been relieved and the need to resort to violence to 
achieve much-needed reform has been obviated.   
Inarguably, social conflicts exert pressure on American society and provide social 
tinder that may be exploited by domestic extremists, especially if mainstream America 
begins to adopt right-wing extremist ideologies.  But in the current health care debate, 
although right-wing extremist ideology unquestionably supports the opposition of the far 
right, mainstream Americans refuse to accept the lenses with which right-wing extremists 
perceive the world.  While most right-wing extremist view health care reform as a victory 
for President Obama and his Democratic Party and thus must be opposed, most 
Americans welcome any reform of the health care system as a social benefit.413  
Additionally, the inability of far right conservatives and their supporting Republican 
politicians to have a moderate discussion “without engaging in a paranoia that [President] 
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Obama is out to get them”414 has made the political party intellectually unattractive to the 
average American.  With the exception of the distrust of government, right-wing 
ideologies simply do not appeal to the general public.  In Chapter III, three right-wing 
ideologies were identified as being potentially operative in the health care reform debate: 
xenophobic and racist beliefs; (2) a distrust of government; and Christian fundamentalism 
and American exceptionalism.  In a survey conducted September 11–13, 2009, Gallup 
reveals that major opposition aligns with a concern against big government while fear of 
socialized medicine, anti-immigrant concerns, and abortion-rights opposition are 
relegated to the fringe.415   
Compared to apprehension produced by right-wing racist and anticommunism 
ideologies, Americans are more concerned that the healthcare legislation could adversely 
affect the cost and quality one’s current health insurance and that could hurt the current 
Medicare program.416  Thus, attempts to capitalize on fears of communism and socialism 
have not moved mainstream America to the right.  According to a September 2009 
survey, most Americans agree that it is the government’s responsibility to provide health 
care benefits to those in need,417 even if tax increase is needed.418  While most right-wing 
extremists “fully embrace the ‘socialism’ attacks on [President] Obama,” Democrats and 
independents largely dismiss these criticisms as “overblown partisan rhetoric” that avoids 
intelligent and honest dialogue.419   
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As discussed in Chapter III, the racist ideology of the far right has also failed to 
get much traction in mainstream America, at least not overtly, due to the strong social 
controls against the direct expression of racist views.  When viewed against recent 
history, these social controls may have been weakened during the administration of 
President George W. Bush when it decided to employ National Guardsmen on the 
border420 and conduct a series of raids by Immigration and Custom Enforcement 
agents.421  In a CBS News poll, 62 percent of Americans supported the Bush 
administration’s decision to militarize the U.S.-Mexico border.422  Additionally, outrage 
over the immigration raids has been muted423 despite the unintentional arrests of legal 
immigrants424 and American citizens.425  The public responses to these policies possibly 
emboldened the far right to at least probe public sentiment in the context of the health 
care reform debate.  The public backlash after the portrayal of President Obama as a 
witch doctor and as a dead primate appears to have pushed overt racism out of the health 
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care reform debate.  The advocacy of white Republican “wise men”426 and public 
acknowledgement that the major healthcare reform is necessary427 may also be 
restraining racist opposition.     
Even corporate America has been distancing themselves from outspoken and 
extreme conservative pundits who inject racism into their rhetoric.  After conservative 
talk show host Glenn Beck called President Obama a racist with a “deep-seated hatred for 
white people or the white culture”428 during his a guest appearance on the “Fox & 
Friends” morning show on July 28, 2009, at least 57 companies “who will not tolerate 
Beck’s race-baiting comments” directed that their advertisements not be run during 
Beck’s time slot.429  Similarly, in October 2009, the overwhelmingly conservative430 
National Football League (NFL) barred conservative pundit Rush Limbaugh from team 
ownership.431  Limbaugh’s bid to buy the St. Louis Rams drew opposition from a number 
of NFL players, owners, and executives because of his “unending line of insults against 
blacks and other minorities.”432  These developments, plus the recent passage of a new 
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hate crime bill,433 send a message that American institutions and society will not tolerate 
racially-motivated rhetoric and antics. 
Attempts to “whip up hate and anger” towards immigrants, portraying them as 
costly and burdensome on any taxpayer-supported health care system,434 have also failed 
to generate opposition to health care reform.  Concerns that undocumented workers 
would be given access to a comprehensive health package appear to have been allayed by 
the inclusion of specific language in the healthcare legislation that prohibits federal 
payment “for affordability credits on behalf of individuals who are not lawfully present in 
the United States.”435  Furthermore, pro-immigration groups have clearly stated that they 
are not advocating that those who have unlawfully immigrated should have access to the 
benefits of broad healthcare reform.  Instead, their main focus is to ensure that the 
verification schemes of the reformed system are not “so stringent and so onerous” that it 
denies access to citizens, lawful residents, and legal resident aliens.436  Healthcare 
legislation requiring proof of citizenship would be unacceptable as millions of American 
citizens—primarily poor, elderly, and minorities—do not possess readily-available, 
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government-issued photo identification.437  Also easing concerns that undocumented 
immigrants impose a burden on American society is the reality that undocumented 
immigrants pay taxes, but do not collect benefits.  The Social Security Administration 
reported that “three quarters of the other-than-legal immigrants pay payroll taxes,” 
generating about $1.5 billion in Medicare taxes,438  which is equivalent to a 0.3 percent 
raise of the payroll tax.439 
In the previous chapter, the anti-abortion ideology was not identified as a major 
player in health care reform because the social conflict around abortion is relatively 
muted outside of religious circles.440  Nevertheless, not only is there specific language in 
the current healthcare legislation that prohibits abortion coverage from being a part of the 
minimum benefits package,441 but there appears to be a healthy amount of both abortion-
rights supporters and opponents in Congress to keep public interest in mind.442   
The only right-wing ideology that resonates with the majority of those opposing 
health care reform is the far right’s ideological distrust of government.  However, the 
difference between the average American and right-wing extremists lies in the trust that 
the checks and balances of the American political system will prevent radical changes 
from endangering the common good.  This is somewhat reflected in the September 2009 
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Gallup survey that revealed that out of the 56 percent of Americans who oppose the 
healthcare legislation, only 30 percent express sentiments against “big government” or 
“too much government involvement.” The remaining opponents disagreed with the 
manner in which health care reform would be executed.443  While right-wing extremists 
oppose health care reform because of their belief that a strong government will intrude in 
individual liberties, most Americans believe the government has a role in regulating free 
markets444 and healthy skepticism keeps the general welfare in mind.   
The government has a reputation for being inefficient, ineffective, and detrimental 
to the market.445  Amid the credit liquidity crisis in 2008, the government reinforced this 
negative reputation by preventing car manufacturer General Motors from declaring 
bankruptcy.  After using taxpayers’ monies to prop up the car manufacturer, the 
government subsequently succumbed to electoral pressures and began interfering with the 
car manufacturer’s “good business decisions.”446  Despite its “hands off” approach to its 
ownership of General Motors,447 lawmakers consistently sought decisions favorable to 
their constituents, even if it meant countermanding the decisions made by car 
manufacturer.   
To address public concern regarding excessive government involvement, 
Congress is taking steps to ensure future government action is not detrimental to free 
market forces.  In addressing the government’s tendency to micromanage the automobile 
manufactures it assisted during the 2008 credit liquidity crisis, Republican senator Bob 
Corker of Tennessee and Democrat senator Mark Warner of Virginia are sponsoring 
legislation that would “shield the car companies from lawmakers’ impulses,”448  by 
creating an independent trust to hold shares of companies where the government’s 
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ownership exceeds ten percent.  Although this legislation is not directly related to health 
care reform, it demonstrates the government’s commitment to limit its influence in 
economic markets and, implicitly, its commitment to limit its influence on health care 
decisions.   
C. DISCUSSION AND HOMELAND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
Although major social structures in the contemporary United States create a 
societal disposition within which right-wing extremism can emerge and flourish, the lack 
of an influential leader to unify the far right and the effective operation of existing social 
controls, including the rejection of right-wing ideologies by mainstream Americans, 
hinder the mobilization of the domestic far right.  Hence, this thesis disagrees with the 
Department of Homeland Security’s April 2009 assessment that the current social, 
economic, and political environment is could very likely to lead to a violent confrontation 
between right-wing extremist groups and government authorities.  This does not imply 
that the domestic far right poses no threat to American society.  It is inherent to right-
wing extremists to resort to, or threaten the use of, some form of violence when they feel 
they cannot advance their social agenda through legitimate political processes.  
Accordingly, there is always a probability that a lone wolf terrorist—the radicalization 
process of whom is beyond the scope of this thesis—will commit a horrendous act of 
violence, independent of any right-wing organization, in an attempt to bring about social 
change.  However, unless all the determinants of collective behavior create a vicious 
cycle that promotes right-wing extremism, it is unlikely that the far right will collectively 
pursue its agenda using violence.   
It is undeniable that social controls are critical in preventing the outbreak of 
collective extremist violence, regardless of political orientation.  In the case of the 
domestic far right and from a homeland security perspective, it is critical to ensure that 
these hindrances remain in place and that new social controls are employed to address the 
structural conduciveness, social conflicts, and right-wing ideologies already present.  
However, without argument, the outcome of the power struggle among conservatives is 
in the hands of the conservatives.  The government has no authority to suppress beliefs 
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and activities protected by the Bill of Rights.  Besides, outright persecution of the 
extreme right—and even just the outright public dismissal of their grievances—may 
reinforce their perception that they are an “oppressed, mocked minority” that has been 
“targeted by a popular culture.”449  Being in the minority may actually strengthen their 
resolve, as witnessed by the far right’s adoption of “persecution politics,”450 which 
accuses opponents of discriminating against and persecuting white Christian 
conservatives.  Consequently, the threat from the far right comes not from an inability to 
restrain the spread of its ideologies, which is currently being rejected by mainstream 
Americans.  Paradoxically, it is in the far right’s isolation in public discourse.451  This is 
akin to the conclusion of the case studies in Chapter II that the lack of political and social 
forums to address legitimate grievances drove the significant minority in their society to 
seek social change through violent means.   
Instead of attempting to suppress right-wing extremists, the government can direct 
its efforts to decrease the possibility of a violent outburst of right-wing violence in two 
ways: (1) by reducing the social structures that create an environment in which right-
wing extremism can emerge and flourish and (2) by encouraging and ensuring the 
effective operation of social controls.  Therefore, the challenge facing homeland security 
experts is not merely preventing the spread of right-wing ideologies with specialized 
police units or legislative controls, but providing a mechanism to address legitimate 
grievances, albeit without agreeing to the underlying ideologies, and to allay fears of 
gross government interference and promote the operation of democratic institutions 
through honest and open discourse.   
The present administration is already conducting a campaign along these lines.  
For example, President Obama has refused to see fierce opposition against health care 
reform as provoked by purely racist motives.452  While acknowledging that racism is not 
                                                 
449 Greenberg et al., “World of Conservative Republicans,” 11. 
450 Dagblog, “Persecution Politics: Paranoia Rules the Right,” October 16, 2009, 
http://networkedblogs.com/p14812026 (accessed November 21, 2009). 
451 Swain, The New White Nationalism, 6-7. 
452 Jeff Zeleny, “Obama Rejects Race as Lead Cause of Criticism,” New York Times, September 18, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/19/health/policy/19obama.html (accessed November 2, 2009). 
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totally responsible for the opposition, the Obama administration sends the message that it 
is willing to consider and address legitimate grievances.  Similarly, in his health care 
speech to Congress on September 9, 2009 and made evident in the subsequent progress 
made in healthcare legislation, the Obama administration has also sought to reassure 
Americans that despite the inherently polarizing bipartisan system, the United States does 
not have a blocked political system.  In contrast, the Obama administration has portrayed 
the government as “bring[ing] the best ideas of both [political] parties together” and 
working towards the common good.453  As healthcare legislation proceeds through the 
political process, the message to put forward is that much-needed social change is 
possible through non-violent means.   
The efforts of the government to counter domestic right-wing extremist rhetoric 
are similar to international efforts to counter radical Islamic extremism.  This should 
come as no surprise—extremism is extremism, regardless of its underlying ideology.  It 
also should not be a surprise that the two strategic recommendations of the Presidential 
Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism address the social 
structures that create the environment in which right-wing extremism can emerge and 
flourish.  One strategic recommendation was to empower mainstream voices that 
compete with extremists; the other recommended addressing legitimate grievances to 
ensure that the extremist’s “narrative does not resonate with individuals’ day-to-day 
lives.”454  The functional recommendations of the task force were in line with the 
effective operation of social controls, and included recommendations to promote reform 
and democracy; emphasize the “bankrupt ideology” of extremists; and exploit and 
amplify ideological fissures between extremists and their supporters and potential 
supporters.455  Future studies should explore how these counter-radicalization approaches 
can be tailored and, if possible, applied in compliance with domestic law.  It is important, 
                                                 
453 White House, “The President’s Plan.”  
454 J. Scott Carpenter, Michael Jacobson, and Matthew Levitt, Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated 
Strategy for Counterradicalization (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2009), 13, 
http://washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PTF2-Counterradicalization.pdf (accessed March 26, 2009). 
455 Carpenter, Jacobson, and Levitt, Rewriting the Narrative, 13–20. 
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for example, that concerns that the incumbent administration is attempting to push its 
ideology on its constituents are appropriately addressed. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis disagrees with the Department of Homeland Security’s April 2009 
assessment that the current social, economic, and political environment is likely to lead to 
a violent confrontation between right-wing extremist groups and government authorities.  
Using the framework provided by the theory of collective behavior, this thesis examined 
the current social, economic, and political environment of the United States—in the 
context of the current health care reform debate—and its influence on the domestic far 
right.  Although major social structures (i.e., structural conduciveness, structural strain, 
and ideology) in contemporary United States create a climate within which right-wing 
extremism can emerge and flourish, the lack of an influential leader to unify the far right 
and the effective operation of existing social controls—including the rejection of right-
wing ideologies by mainstream Americans—hinder the mobilization of the domestic far 
right.   
To counter right-wing extremism in the United States, the government should 
avoid dismissing outright the grievances of the far right, as this may actually strengthen 
their belief that the multicultural American society is discriminating against and 
persecuting white Christian conservatives.  Instead, the government should direct its 
efforts to decrease the possibility of a violent outburst of right-wing violence by (1) 
reducing the social structures that create an environment in which right-wing extremism 
can emerge and flourish and (2) by encouraging and ensuring the effective operation of 
social controls.  Efforts along these lines would be similar to those countering radical 
Islamic extremism.  Further studies are needed to explore how counter-radicalization 
approaches against Islamic extremists can be tailored and, if possible, applied in 
compliance with domestic law. 
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